

Alexander Moens, Lenard J. Cohen, & Allen G. Sens. (eds.)  
***NATO and European Security: Alliance Politics from the End of the Cold War to the Age of Terrorism***  
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Giles Scott-Smith  
Roosevelt Center, Middelburg, Netherlands

This is a collection of ten essays on the transformation of the transatlantic relationship within NATO during the 1990s. While the introduction refers briefly to the consequences of 9/11 for the Alliance, all the contributions were completed before that cataclysmic event. The 'Age of Terrorism' in the title therefore serves only to demarcate the boundary to the book's contents rather than describe the contents themselves, and as a result it has a strong 1990s feel to it despite its publication date of 2003. The major issues that figure in many of the essays are the development of the EU's European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP), the US commitment to National Missile Defence (NMD), and how these may fit within the overall purpose and outlook of NATO. There is some overlap as the first five chapters cover the significance of ESDP, albeit from slightly different approaches. Three of the other essays refer specifically to the dilemmas for Canadian defence and security policy, since the three editors are based at Canadian universities and financial support was obtained from, among other sources, the Canadian Department of National Defense. Probably as a result, the general tone of the authors is one of optimistic problem-solving: NATO remains the only security arrangement in town, and it is just a question of accepting the new realities of post-Cold War relations and technological advances and focusing on how best to adapt to them. From their vantage point in late 2001 the editors saw no reason to suspect that either the Bush administration or the war on terror would bring any major negative consequences for the Alliance. Instead, from the perspective of late 2005 ESDP, NMD, and NATO itself all suffer from chronic credibility gaps and identity crises.

Yet it would be wrong to dismiss this book as a museum piece. The 1991-2001 period is indeed a fascinating one for NATO analysts, with the US and the Europeans jockeying for pole position to reconfigure a post-Cold War Alliance. NATO was already well on the way to becoming a looser alliance before 9/11, and it was the Yugoslavian wars in its own backyard that forced this to occur, particularly the experience of Kosovo. This has been far from a consensual transition. The American drive for 'full spectrum dominance' in all aspects of military affairs has created a technology and capabilities gap impossible for the Europeans to close, making the demands from Washington that they should try rather hollow. The development of a blueprint for a European security framework (ESDP), which could match European capabilities with specific peace-making and peace-keeping tasks (the so-called Petersburg tasks), was met in turn with Albright's declamation that this must lead to no decoupling, duplication, or discrimination. Article 5, once the cornerstone of NATO, no longer holds such relevance now that a general consensus on the main threats to the alliance has disappeared. But the Europeans were far from blameless for the contradictions that were emerging. The exceptional essays in this collection by Jolyon Howorth and John Bryson cover this territory well. Much is made of the UK u-turn at St. Malo in December 1998, when it looked as if a new London-Paris axis could breathe seriousness into EU ambition. Instead, French enthusiasm for placing NATO on a new footing rapidly diminished, and Blair's apparent commitment to a European defence structure turned out to be no more than another vacuous attempt at placing Britain in the role of Atlantic 'bridge'. Through this malaise the

Clinton administrations (especially Defense Secretary Cohen) proved themselves far more willing to search for compromises than their successors. There is no hint in this volume that the contributors were prepared for Rumsfeld's 'divide and rule' approach to NATO, within the context of Bush's 'for or against us', 'coalition of the willing' mentality.

Other gaps are also apparent in the book's commentary. There is surprisingly little, for instance, on the issue of NATO enlargement, and Russia only figures in the chapter on nuclear weapons as a hypothetical enemy no longer of actual strategic concern. The collection is only saved from being too narrow by the sections on Canada, which bring home well the policy dilemmas faced by that country with an overbearing neighbour to its south and natural but divided allies an ocean away. All in all, then, a useful volume with some quality contributions, but those interested should be aware of its somewhat limited scope.