The ‘Clash of Civilizations’ and the ‘War on Terror’

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Interviewer: What is your opinion about what is being said concerning your analogies and the ‘Clash of Civilizations’? Your constant use and repetition of the word ‘Crusade’ and ‘Crusader’ show that you uphold this saying, the ‘Clash of Civilizations’.

Osama bin Laden: I say there is no doubt about this. This is a very clear matter...”

Since the 9/11 terrorist attacks and the subsequent declaration of a US-led ‘war on terror’, the spectre of a ‘clash of civilizations’ between ‘Islam’ and ‘the West’ has frequently loomed. But what is the relationship between the ‘clash of civilizations’ and the ‘war on terror’? The latter is, for many, simply the clash between ‘Islam’ and ‘the West’ that Samuel P Huntington predicted would be an inevitable part of the post-Cold War world. Crucially, this conviction is as true for the leaders of the al-Qaeda network as it is for those Western policymakers who subscribe to Huntington’s theory. This article will attempt to critique the application of ‘clash of civilizations’ theory to the ‘war on terror’, and will then seek to construct a different means of understanding and conceptualising the ‘war on terror’. It will posit that the ‘war on terror’ is not in fact a ‘clash of civilizations’, but a conflict between two powerful groups of elites, for whom the ‘clash of civilizations’ is an essential form of discourse.

‘Clash of civilizations’ theory first came to prominence in Huntington's 1993 Foreign Affairs article entitled ‘The Clash Of Civilizations’.* In it, Huntington argued that post-Cold War conflict would not be ideological or economic, but cultural. Identifying, “seven or eight major civilizations,” he suggested that, “[t]he most important conflicts of the future will occur along the fault lines separating these civilizations from one another.” The article’s most famous (or infamous) statement comes when Huntington suggests a linkage between ‘Islamic civilization’ and violence: “[i]n Eurasia the great historic fault lines between civilizations are once more aflame. This is particularly true along the boundaries of the crescent-shaped Islamic bloc of nations from the bulge of Africa to central Asia. Violence also occurs between Muslims, on the one hand, and Orthodox Serbs in the Balkans, Jews in Israel, Hindus in India, Buddhists in Burma and Catholics in the Philippines. Islam has bloody borders.” One could take issue with Huntington’s argument here – it seems grossly unfair to suggest that regional conflicts such as those in Bosnia, Palestine or Kashmir are all the fault of Muslims, where Muslims are sometimes the minority and often face

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discrimination – but in many ways this is a moot point. What is more important is the fact that, after 9/11, many of Huntington’s concepts and definitions – such as his depiction of Islam’s “bloody borders” – gained new standing.

Huntington expanded upon this article with follow up articles, then in his 1996 book, *The Clash Of Civilizations And The Remaking Of World Order*. In fairness to Huntington, he argues in the opening passage that his original article suffers from, “misrepresentation”, for example in the way that most readers ignored the question mark in its title- though this is somewhat disingenuous in light of the fact that he dropped the same question mark from the book’s title. It is clear that, despite feeling his article was misrepresented, Huntington stands by its claims. He even devotes an entire section to proving that Islam’s borders are, indeed, bloody. One could go on critiquing Huntington’s theory, but this would be to miss the point; disproving it, no matter how conclusively, would not prevent the core concepts of the ‘clash of civilizations’ from being applied to the ‘war on terror’. It is the way in which others have taken Huntington’s theory and used it to justify or support the ‘war on terror’ that are most important. Ziauddin Sardar and Merryl Wyn Davies ask, “is it surprising that many in the West see today’s ‘war on terrorism’ as the prelude to a renewed clash of civilizations? The question is in every newspaper and magazine. It did not need the right-wing American political scientist Samuel Huntington to pose the question- the idea has never actually gone away.” The issue at hand is not simply, ‘how does one disprove Huntington’s theory?’, but rather, ‘how does one challenge the way in which it has been applied?’

How has the ‘clash of civilizations’ been applied to the ‘war on terror’? This question, perhaps unsurprisingly, offers a large number of Western politicians, scholars and commentators who see in the post-9/11 world a confirmation of Huntington’s predictions. But it also shows that this link can be found in the thinking of another group- the al-Qaeda network.

Huntington’s definition of ‘the civilization’ itself has influenced and shaped the rhetoric of the ‘war on terror’. Kepel suggests that Huntington’s article is, “[p]art of the theoretical underpinning,” for US policy-makers’ distinction between ‘civilized nations’ and ‘rogue’ states. This is certainly borne out in former-Secretary of Defence Donald Rumsfeld’s comment that, “[i]f one looks down from outer space on earth, you find a couple of handfuls of countries that are generally like thinking, and they tend to be Western Europe and North America. They have freer economic systems, and tend not to covet the land or property or lives of other nations.” Furthermore, the phrase ‘war on terror’ itself “was engineered to heighten fear while simultaneously tapping the righteous indignation of citizens in ‘civilized nations’ against barbaric murderers who would perpetrate despicable atrocities on innocent victims.”

Thus, ‘clash of civilizations’ rhetoric is intertwined with the very language of the ‘war on terror’. Rumsfeld – a leading advocate of US involvement in the ‘war on terror’ – believed that there were just a small handful of (well-off, Western) nations that could be trusted not to covet the commodities and “lives” of others. For every instance in which President George W Bush stated that “there is no clash of civilizations,” or dismissed it as “a passing myth of history,” one can
find him alluding to the need for ‘civilized people’ to unite against ‘rogue states’. In his speech to Congress on 19 September, 2001, for example, Bush outlined his vision for the ‘war on terror’ stating, “[t]his is civilization’s fight.”\textsuperscript{18} Whilst the US government may have seemingly sought to avoid the notion of a clash between ‘Islam’ and ‘the West’, the rhetoric of ‘civilizations’ still crept into its dialogue.

The work of the academic Bernard Lewis is important in this context since, while not a member of the government, he has had significant influence on key members of the Bush administration: “Lewis has been especially sought after in Washington since September 11th. Karl Rove invited him to speak at the White House. Richard Perle and Dick Cheney are among his admirers … And his best-selling book ‘What Went Wrong?,’ about the decline of Muslim civilization, is regarded in some circles as a kind of handbook in the war against Islamist terrorism.”\textsuperscript{19} In 2004, \textit{Time} included Lewis in its list of 100 most influential scientists and thinkers,\textsuperscript{20} and Edward Said suggested that, “[w]hat made Lewis’s work so appalling in its effects was the fact that without any other views to counter his, American policy-makers...fell for them.”\textsuperscript{21} It was Lewis, in fact, who coined the term ‘clash of civilizations’ in a 1990 \textit{Atlantic} article,\textsuperscript{22} and much of his work is based upon the assumption that clearly defined ‘civilizations’ exist – and that conflict between them is inevitable.

In 2003 Lewis argued that “[t]he confrontation with a force that defines itself as Islam has given a new relevance – indeed, urgency – to the theme of the ‘clash of civilizations,’”\textsuperscript{23} and his 2003 book (whose title, \textit{The Crisis Of Islam}, provides a hint as to its contents) clearly presents his vision of the ‘war on terror’ as a ‘clash of civilizations’. Its opening paragraph discusses, “the war in which we are engaged,”\textsuperscript{24} making it clear that he will not challenge the assumption that “we” are currently at war with terrorism. As in the above-mentioned article, Lewis discusses the complexities of using the term ‘Islam’ before concisely and simply defining it as a civilization based on its religion: “[i]n the one sense it denotes a religion, a system of belief and worship; in the other, the civilization that grew up and flourished under the aegis of that religion.”\textsuperscript{25} He also makes clear that hatred from the Muslim world is, “directed against us,” and that, “[o]ften this hatred goes beyond the level of hostility to specific interests or actions or policies or even countries, and becomes a rejection of Western civilization as such, not so much for what it does as for what it is.”\textsuperscript{26} So: ‘Islam’ hates “Western civilization” because of “what it is”. This is a clear depiction of a ‘clash of civilizations’ which is – significantly – not caused by the policies or actions of “Western civilization”, but simply because ‘they’ hate ‘us’.

Yet no matter how reductionist, overly-simplistic and one-sided such arguments may seem, Lewis’ influence – whether this be getting invited into the White House by Karl Rove, or convincing key figures in the US administration that the world can be categorised and understood in terms of warring civilizations – should not be underestimated. And this rhetoric can be found in any number of places. Shortly after 9/11, Italian Prime Minister Silvio Berlusconi notoriously referred to the, “superiority of our civilization,” over Islam.\textsuperscript{27} Paul Bremer, while on the Homeland Security Task Force stated that, “[t]here’s no point in addressing the so-called root causes of bin Laden’s despair with us. We are the root causes of
his terrorism. He doesn’t like America. He doesn’t like our society. He doesn’t like what we stand for. He doesn’t like our values. And short of the United States going out of existence, there’s no way to deal with the root cause of his terrorism," clearly implying that our “society”, our “values” and “what we stand for” are the cause of other’s terrorism. And former CIA bin Laden analyst Michael Scheuer stated in his first book, *Through Our Enemies’ Eyes* (published in 2002 but mostly written before 9/11) that, “the ongoing confrontation between the forces led and inspired by Osama bin Laden and those led by the United States is fast moving toward the status of a clash of civilizations,” and that, “violent clashes between the West and Islam will be a central feature of world affairs for the foreseeable future.”

The concept of clashing civilizations, then, is deeply ingrained in the thought structures of Western diplomats, scholars, intelligence analysts, officials and Presidents. Such language points to a dangerous state of affairs; it removes from the equation the possibility that Islamic militancy may have its own political and strategic aims beyond a desire to destroy our more modern, superior ‘Western civilization,’ and implies the need for all-out warfare to combat this threat. But this rhetoric cuts both ways. The implication that civilizations are at war also plays into the hands of the al-Qaeda leadership, providing an ‘us versus them’ discourse which serves to boost recruitment and commitment to the cause.

What do the al-Qaeda network have to say about the ‘clash of civilizations’? Significantly, and perhaps not surprisingly, Huntington’s book is a bestseller in the Middle East, “no doubt one of the most widely available of the Western works translated into Arabic.” The al-Qaeda network’s militants “adore” Huntington, “for he brings grist to their mill: the two civilizations are incompatible.” Huntington’s work, in fact, “is the top reference for all Islamist militants, thrilled by the cultural rift that gives credence to their confrontational ideology.”

Olivier Roy shows that the ‘clash of civilizations’ has become a convenient form of discourse on both sides of the conflict: “Huntington is regularly accused of having introduced the concept of the ‘clash of civilizations’ … But this approach is also shared by fundamentalists and conservative Muslims” [italics mine].

These specific points are vital: ‘clash of civilizations’ rhetoric is not limited to the US and Europe- many al-Qaeda militants also view the current US-led conflicts in the Middle East as proof of a clash between ‘Islam’ and ‘the West’.

Gilles Kepel points out that Ayman al-Zawahiri’s text *Knights Under The Prophet’s Banner,* “presents a worldview comparable – but in reverse – to Samuel Huntington’s famous clash of civilizations. According to this perspective, ‘the battle is universal’ and, ‘the Western forces hostile to Islam have clearly identified their enemy- which they call ‘Islamic fundamentalism.’” Zawahiri’s book is a, “jihadist reading of the clash of civilizations,” and a closer look at Zawahiri’s language certainly bears this out. The text identifies, “a number of tools to fight Islam” created by the West, including the United Nations, the rulers of Muslim countries, and various multinational bodies such as corporations, the media and relief agencies. Zawahiri believes that, “[i]n the face of this alliance, a fundamentalist coalition is taking shape. It is made up of the jihad movements in the various lands of Islam as well as the two countries that have been liberated in the name of jihad for the sake of God (Afghanistan and Chechnya),” and that
this coalition, “represents a growing power that is rallying under the banner of jihad for the sake of God and operating outside the scope of the new world order. It is free of the servitude for the dominating western empire. It promises destruction and ruin for the new Crusades against the lands of Islam.”

The imagery of an Islamic coalition, uniting against Western crusaders resembles nothing more than a “jihadist reading” of Huntington’s text.

Furthermore, when, “in October 2001 when [al-Jazeera journalist] Tayseer Allouni asked Bin Laden if he agreed with the concept of a ‘clash of civilizations’, he received this reply: ‘Absolutely. The (holy) Book states it clearly. Jews and Americans invented the myth of peace on earth … The prophet said: ‘The hour will not come until the Muslims fight the Jews and kill them.’”

Again, al-Qaeda’s own statements have always reinforced this view. Bin Laden’s 1996 Declaration Of War Against The Americans Occupying The Land Of The Two Holy Places opens with this statement: “The people of Islam awakened and realised that they are the main target for the aggression of the Zionist / Crusaders alliance,” clearly presenting two warring civilizations, with ‘the West’ (including Israel) on one side and their victims, “[t]he people of Islam”, on the other. As Roy notes, “the extension of US power throughout the world is mirrored by the call for the defence of an imaginary ummah that is everywhere and nowhere. This mirror construction of US might and its arch enemy is expressed by the cliché of the decade: the clash of civilizations.”

So it is apparent that the rhetoric of a ‘clash of civilizations’ can be found within the upper echelons of al-Qaeda, too. Clearly, the creation of a discourse that portrays ‘Islam’ on the one hand and ‘the West’ on the other, is also beneficial to the leaders of Islamic militant groups.

It becomes increasingly obvious that, as with the US and Europe, where the idea of a ‘clash of civilizations’ is deployed by policy makers with little consideration for how it will benefit the ordinary individual, al-Qaeda’s portrayal of the same clash does nothing for the average Arab or Muslim. Roy notes al-Qaeda’s has failed to “build a strong political organisation,” adding that in the Muslim world, “[t]he ‘masses’ are left on the pavement, watching some sort of apocalyptic video game played by Al Qaeda.” Meanwhile, Kepel portrays Zawahiri as a member of Egypt’s aristocracy who, when writing his book, “did not seem to believe he had anything to learn from the masses. As his subtext made clear, he alone held the truth that would inspire the people with an energy they lacked. Throughout his book ordinary Muslims were depicted as passive, sickly, and devoid of conscience.”

This is an important conception- al-Qaeda as an elitist organisation, playing out its ‘clash of civilizations’ while ordinary people are left to pick up the pieces. While the leaderships of ‘the West’ and the militant Islamist networks do battle to defend their ‘civilization’, it is the non-combatant individual who suffers. Benjamin Barber makes this point concisely in his 2001 introduction to Jihad vs. McWorld:

Hyperbolic commentators such as Samuel Huntington have described the current divide in the world as a global clash of civilizations, and warn of a cultural war between democracy and Islam, perhaps even between ‘the West and the rest’. But this is to ape the messianic rhetoric of Osama bin Laden, who has called for precisely such a war.
The difference between bin Laden’s terrorists and the poverty-stricken third-world constituents he tries to call to arms, however, is the difference between radical Jihadic fundamentalists and ordinary men and women concerned to feed their children and nurture their religious communities.\(^\text{43}\)

The al-Qaeda network has a set of distinct goals, and is not simply driven by hatred of America or ‘who we are’; these goals include, “getting Crusaders and Zionists out of Saudi Arabia, getting Crusaders and Zionists out of other Islamic areas and uniting and expanding the community of believers.”\(^\text{44}\) It has, furthermore, a set of methods and tactics for achieving these: “[the] attacks on the twin towers and the Pentagon were not a thunderbolt out of the blue. They were part of a precise, carefully considered programme that combined the logic of jihad, the operational tactics of guerilla warfare, the opportunist advantages offered by the Arab-Israeli conflict during the second intifada, and the political influence of the neoconservative ideology on US foreign policy- all of which worked to the advantage of radical Islam.”\(^\text{45}\)

The British journalist Jason Burke adds that, “Bin Laden is an activist with a very clear sense of what he wants and how he hopes to achieve it … his agenda is basically a political one, though it is couched, of course, in religious language and imagery.”\(^\text{46}\) This is something that ‘clash of civilizations’ thinking fails to consider. It is an important point. A radical Islamic network with its own defined policies and strategies, fighting a US-led coalition with its own policies and strategies is a very different proposition to ‘Islamic civilization’ rising up to fight ‘Western civilization’.

If al-Qaeda has a clear political strategy and ideology, then, the ‘war on terror’ should be viewed not as a ‘clash of civilizations’, but as a confrontation between the leaderships of two powerful structures. Discussing the al-Qaeda attack on the US in September 2001, and the US attack on Afghanistan in October 2001, Noam Chomsky suggested that, “in both cases the crimes are considered right and just, even noble, within the doctrinal framework of the perpetrators; and in fact are justified in almost the same words [italics mine].”\(^\text{47}\) He also argues that, after 9/11, it is the general public who are “peering into the abyss of the future,” while, “[t]hose at the centre of power relentlessly pursue their own agendas, understanding that they can exploit the fears and anguish of the moment. They may even institute measures that deepen the abyss and may march resolutely toward it, if that advances the goals of power and privilege.”\(^\text{48}\)

It is those who already have power and privilege who stand to gain from the ‘war on terror’. Those who will be caught up among the killing – the war on terror’s victims – have nothing to gain. Burke posits that, “[i]f the world is understood as dominated by a cosmic struggle between good and evil, all problems are explained. An individual can explain personal and communal suffering and humiliation. Even better, he can blame someone for both … This is hugely empowering. Those who take part in the cosmic struggle are holy warriors, proud, strong, deserving of respect and prestige. Moreover, being at war implies the possibility of victory and offers a vision of the means to achieve it.”\(^\text{49}\) Thus, the ‘war on terror’ is reduced by those with power and influence to a narrative of ‘good versus evil’ that allows the central figures and ideologues of both the Bush administration and the al-Qaeda network to continue their pursuit of power and
privilege. The language of the ‘clash of civilizations’, with its ‘us and them’ rhetoric, is perfect for this purpose.

I would argue that what is required is not a means to defend ‘our civilization’ against an ‘Other’, or to place blame at the door of US foreign policy while removing all agency from Muslims. What is needed is an alternative method of understanding the post-9/11 world, which undermines those for whom a ‘clash of civilizations’ is the perfect means to extend their power and influence. This is what Tariq Ali advocates in his opposition to both sides in the ‘clash of fundamentalisms’, arguing that, “it is necessary to oppose both and create a space in the world of Islam and the West in which freedom of thought and imagination can be defended without fear of persecution of death.” It is also what Barber promotes in his opposition to both the all-powerful ‘McWorld’ and its violent by-product, ‘Jihad’. Barber envisages, “a war between Jihad and McWorld that cannot be won,” and believes that, “[o]nly a struggle of democracy against not solely Jihad but also against McWorld can achieve a just victory for the planet.”

Sardar and Davies believe that in the ‘war on terror’, “[t]wo factions that intuitively understand each other are ready to engage in apocalyptic battle,” but that, “[i]t is less clear that the rest of American society, the Muslim world or the world in general can intervene to question the policies and change the course of events to moderate a slide into increasing danger and insecurity for everyone, everywhere.” Yet such pessimism is not necessarily warranted. The first step must surely be for us to acknowledge the need for democracy and equality to prevail over the clashing ‘fundamentalisms’ of ‘Jihad’ and ‘McWorld’. After all, Osama bin Laden’s attempts to provoke a ‘clash of civilizations’ have, “turned out to be a spectacular failure.” One can find evidence for this in the Iranians who gathered outside of the US embassy in Tehran on the night of 9/11, not to chant anti-US slogans but to offer their sympathies, or to the enduring anti-war movement in the West. These examples are the antitheses to the ‘clash of civilizations’, and are evidence that ordinary individuals – potential victims of the ‘war on terror’ – motivated by their concern for other ordinary individuals, are willing and able to register their opposition to the policies of those in power. One might conceive of this as evidence of the emergence of Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri’s ‘multitude’; “the living alternative that grows within Empire,” which might be able “to communicate and act in common while remaining internally different” and ultimately challenge and question those in power.

With this in mind, it is possible to end this essay on a note of optimism. The ‘clash of civilizations’ and even the notion of ‘war on terror’ itself can, conceivably, be challenged. One is not forced to choose between lining up “with us or against us.” It is viable to challenge both of the powers engaged in their self-styled ‘war’. The rhetoric of a ‘clash of civilizations’ may suit the leadership and elite on both sides of the ‘war on terror’, by providing simple ‘us versus them’ rhetoric, and acting as a rallying call to garner support for this clash. Yet below this level, for the typical individual, such rhetoric serves no purpose. The clash is not between two distinct ‘civilizations’, but between two powerful structures for which such language is beneficial. There are compelling alternatives to viewing the post-9/11 world situation as a ‘clash of civilizations’. If we embrace these,
then it is possible that we might find a way to avert both the bloodshed of terrorism, and the bloodshed of ‘war on terrorism’.

2 It would be useful to define my usage of the term ‘war on terror’ here. While there can be no doubt that the Bush administration has repeatedly declared that the US is at war with terror (or terrorism), one is unconvinced of the validity of the term ‘war on terror’. As Jonathan Raban says, “To isolate [the term] in sceptical quotation marks can be an act of mild, justifiable pedantry: terrorism is a belligerent means, not an object or enemy, and declaring war on it is like declaring war on tanks, or bows and arrows. It can also be an act of political dissent, identifying the writer’s mistrust of the whole enterprise.” See Jonathan Raban, “The Truth About Terrorism,” *New York Review Of Books* 52, no. 1 (13/1/2005): http://www.nybooks.com/articles/17676 (accessed 27/9/2006).

3 As with the term ‘war on terror’, concepts such as ‘Islam’ and ‘the West’ prove equally difficult to define simply and conclusively. For our purposes, ‘the West’ will refer mainly to the US and Europe and other close allies such as Canada and Australia (such nations are sometimes referred to as the ‘developed world’ or ‘global north’). These countries form a closely-aligned unit in the ‘war on terror’, and so may be referred to as one entity without necessarily accepting Huntington’s definition of a ‘Western civilization’ defined by a common religion. The term ‘Islam’ is often used interchangeably with other terms such as ‘Arab’ or ‘the Middle East’, but it is hoped that this article can avoid this. One must also recognise that Islam, like all major religions, is not monolithic, and contains many different interpretations and variations.

4 A satisfactory usage and definition of the term ‘al-Qaeda’, which does not mislead the reader, can also be difficult to find. One is tempted to try to define another more representative term, however it is felt that as long as it is understood what al-Qaeda is (and isn’t) the term holds up. Jason Burke provides the most useful means of understanding al-Qaeda. He explains that al-Qaeda is, “less an organisation than an ideology” Jason Burke, “Think Again: Al-Qaeda” *Foreign Policy* (May / June 2004): http://www.foreignpolicy.com/story/cms.php?story_id=2536&page=0 (accessed 27/9/2006). We must not fall into the trap of viewing al-Qaeda as single, cohesive terrorist unit, under the direct command of Osama bin Laden. Burke suggests that since the very early days of the 2001 war in Afghanistan al-Qaeda has not existed as a definite group. For the most part, al-Qaeda “is not about being part of a group. It is a way of thinking about the world, a way of understanding events, of interpreting and behaving.” Jason Burke, *Al-Qaeda: The True Story Of Radical Islam*, (London: Penguin, 2004), 14. Burke adds that while the al-Qaeda group that resided in Afghanistan up until 9/11 may have been destroyed, “[t]he idea of ‘al-Qaeda’ - the precepts, the maxim, the formula … is more powerful than ever.” We can, then, use the term ‘al-Qaeda’, but it is important to recognise that in using it we are referring to a loose group – a “network of networks,” (Ibid., 13-14) – or an ideology, rather than to a single cohesive terrorist band.


6 Ibid.

7 Ibid.


10 Ibid., 15.
11 Ibid., 254-258.


15 Kepel, The War For Muslims Minds, 112.


25 Ibid., 3.

26 Ibid., 22.


31 Ibid., 133.


33 Kepel, *The War For Muslims Minds*, 94.

34 Ibid., 99.


36 Ibid.

37 Ibid.

38 Kepel, *The War For Muslims Minds*, 123.


40 Ibid., 293.


53 Ibid., xxxi.

