The chief absorbing and litigious hub within contemporary international politics is that pertaining to the so-called revolutionary foreign policy embarked on by President Bush. Have neo-conservatives ‘hijacked’ the Bush administration’s foreign policy and ‘neo-conned’ the international community? That is the charge of conspiracy theorists and opponents of the Iraq war. Those analogous to Stefan Halper and Jonathan Clarke who argue that neo-conservatism has been the key component shaping the Bush administration exaggerate the influence of this exacting ideology. The objective of this manuscript is four-fold: A precarious alternative to hegemony comprises the introduction. Secondly, after introducing the cause célèbre of international politics, I underscore the myths of the slogan. Additionally, Toenjes’s data-set encompassing organizational activity and webs of inter-locking memberships is interpreted. Thirdly, I refute the theories that erroneously presume that Bush himself is an empty vassal, a latter-day equivalent of Czarina Alexandra and the reverse hypothesis of Bush the revolutionary. Therein, the conflation of the two conservative blocs undergirding Bush’s foreign policy is attended to. These forerunner themes escort the fourth and final, which contests the conjecture proclaiming the revolutionary nature of U.S. post-9/11 strategy. In defence, I employ foreign policy precedents from the wars on piracy; the Rooseveltian era and; the two preceding administration’s.

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Unless you live at the bottom of a well, you’ve probably noticed that 9/11 and Iraq have had a transforming effect on the American right. The short formulation is that so-called neo-conservatism has triumphed.¹

Jonathan Rauch

But for those potholing in Trans-Dniester one and all would comprehend the aforementioned excessive excerpt.² Standing peripheral to the circle of the neo-conservatives, their authority appears as a superseding freemasonry or *eminence grise* ‘directing a parochial Court’.³ Such an episode was ironically forecast by Condoleezza Rice in 2000 who stated that, ‘the absence of an articulated “national interest” creates a vacuum to be filled by parochial groups.’⁴

According to the BBC’s flagship documentary program, *Panorama*, a “small and unelected group of right-wingers...have hijacked the White House.”⁵ The lack of appreciation as to the compass and credence of neo-conservatism in United States’s foreign policy is endemic—even among close allies.⁶ “I never quite understand what people mean by this neo-con thing.” This was the remarkable admission Prime Minister Blair made to the BBC.⁷

The paper is fashioned to aid Prime Minister Blair and fretful parties distinguish the deportment of the neo-conservatives who have not dictated the Bush administration’s foreign policy.⁸ Moreover, the manuscripts ink acknowledges that George W. Bush’s foreign policy has been characterised primarily by a dissimilar breed of conservative judgment in executing his forefathers’ precedents.⁹

At this preliminary juncture, the author desires rapidly to disregard two customary components of U.S foreign policy. After which, an illustration as to the precarious alternative to U.S. hegemony is presented, undergirded by historical precedents.

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² See BBC ‘Regions and Territories.’ The separatist region of Trans-Dniester is a narrow strip of land between the Dniester River and the Ukrainian border which proclaimed independence from Moldova in 1990: visit [http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/europe/country_profiles/3641826.stm](http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/europe/country_profiles/3641826.stm).
⁸ The character of the paper’s title is borne from the phrase, “It’s the economy, stupid!” The slogan was made famous by political strategist James Carville, who hung it on a sign in Bill Clinton’s Little Rock campaign office to keep everybody “on message” in the 1992 election.
First and foremost, it is paramount the reader comprehends that the traditional tale of American ‘virtuous isolationism’ is utter nonsense. From Presidents Washington to Wilson there was a permanent atmosphere of war which ensued that U.S. troops were stationed on all continents. ‘Expansion of territory and influence has been the inescapable reality of American history,’ writes Robert Kagan.  

Secondly, immeasurable integers of commentators have erroneously oversimplified the transfer from multilateralism to unilateralism in U.S. post–9/11 foreign policy. One such appraiser was Chris Pattern, the European Union (EU) External Affairs Commissioner, who warned against the U.S. slipping into “unilateralist overdrive.”

The author further directs the reader to dispel this mythical indictment, avowing that the U.S. has never pursued an indubitably multilateralist foreign policy in modern times. Rather, U.S. strategy in the post–1945 period is aptly characterized as

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hegemonic. In classic parlance, hegemony designed an aptitude to escort from a relative position of strength.

The supreme method of recounting U.S. policy during the Cold War era is as an ‘institutionalist’ rather than ‘multilateralist.’ While the U.S. escorted the erection of multilateral institutions, the injunction to perform multilateral unendingly applied more to junior partners in these organizations than the hegemon itself. This is the corollary of a *dues ex machina* figure arising from the ashes of two World–Wars. Put simply, Bush is an anti–isolationist, unilateralist sympathetic –though this is not revolutionary.

Critics of U.S. hegemony should pause and consider the alternative. Harvard Professor Niall Ferguson scholarly illustrates the precarious substitute:

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13 Niall Ferguson states that, ‘the word was used originally to describe the relationship of Athens to the other Greek city–states when they leagued together to defend themselves against the Persian Empire; Athens lead but did not rule over the others.’ See Niall Ferguson, “Colossus: The Rise and Fall of the American Empire,” 2005 p.9. Equally, Michael Cox terms ‘hegemony to imply overwhelming power but power employed and deployed to lead others.’ See Michael Cox, “September 11th and U.S. Hegemony –or Will the 21st Century Be American Too?” *International Studies Perspectives* vol.3, 2002 p.3; see also Nicholas Onuf and Frank Rlink, “Anarchy, Authority, Rule,” *International Studies Quarterly*, vol. 33, 1989 p.164. Hegemony is “supremacy within a control area,” which in international relations is “a sphere of influence.” Similarly, Elke Krähmann states that, ‘hegemony...is defined in terms of the distribution of capabilities within the international system.’ See Elke Krähmann, “American Hegemony or Global Governance? Competing Visions of International Security,” *International Studies Review*, vol.7, 2005 p.533. Thus, during the Cold War, hegemony was ascribed to the U.S. in relation to its allies in the North Atlantic. However, throughout this period, the U.S. was not a hegemon vis-à-vis the members of the Warsaw Pact.

14 See Michael Cox, “September 11th and U.S. Hegemony –or Will the 21st Century Be American Too?” *International Studies Perspectives* vol.3, 2002 p.64; see also William Kristol and Robert Kagan, “Toward a Neo–Reaganite Foreign Policy,” *Foreign Affairs*, July/August 1996; Joseph Nye notes that, ‘all too often, hegemony is used to refer to different behaviours and degrees of control, which obscures rather than clarifies the analysis. For example, Charles Doran cites aggressive military power, while Robert Keohane looks at preponderance in economic resources. Robert Gilpin sometimes uses the terms *imperial* and *hegemonic* interchangeably to refer to a situation in which a “single powerful states controls or dominates the lesser states in the system.”’ See Joseph Nye, “Bound to Lead: The Changing Nature of American Power,” 1991 pp.38–39.


16 See Peter Gowan, “A Calculus of Power,” *New Left Review*, July/August 2002 p.64. The author terms this ‘asymmetrical interdependence’ among allies. For interdependence to exist there must be some degree of reciprocal effects in relations between actors, though one party is more affected than the other; see also Gary Dorrien, “Imperial Designs: Neoconservatism and the New Pax Americana,” 2004 p.27.

17 See Michael Dunne, “U.S. foreign relations in the twentieth century: from world power to global hegemony,” *International Affairs* vol.76, 2000 pp.27–28. The ‘unilateralist label that has been applied to Bush does not fully describe the range of his international relations.’ Bush has been a very strong supporter of international trade. Furthermore, he has reached out to countries that have historically had an ambivalent relationship with the U.S.; in Mexico and India. Bush is also a man who has placed tremendous stock in his relationships with a number of foreign leaders. He has genuinely embraced Vicente Fox, Vladimir Putin and Tony Blair.” See Stanley A. Renshon. “Presidential Address George W. Bush’s Cowboy Politics: An Inquiry,” *Political Psychology* vol.26, 2005 p.596; see also Mary Buckley and Rob Singh (ed.), “The Bush Doctrine and the War on Terrorism,” 2006 p.27. Unilateralism represents ‘the oldest doctrine’ of all in American foreign policy; Francis Fukuyama, “After the Neocons: America at the Crossroads,” 2006 p.83. Fukuyama writes that, ‘…unilateralism was not a new feature of American foreign policy.’
If the U.S. retreats from its hegemonic role, who would supplant it, not Europe, not China, not the Muslim world—and certainly not the U.N.\(^\text{18}\) Unfortunately, the alternative to a single superpower is not a multilateral utopia, but the anarchic nightmare of a New Dark Age. Moreover, the alternative to unipolarity would not be multipolarity at all. It would be ‘apolarity’—a global vacuum of power.\(^\text{19}\)

Bush’s foreign policy has its roots in a strain of dated realist political thinking best labelled hegemonist.\(^\text{20}\) The U.S. lives in a dangerous world, one closer to Thomas Hobbes’s state of nature, in which life is “war of all against all,” than to Immanuel Kant’s perpetual peace, “in which the idea of a law of world citizenship is no high–flown notion.”\(^\text{21}\)

The universal construal of Hobbes’s conception of international relations centers around his renowned delineation of the state of nature as a realm in which “it is manifest that during the time that men live without a common power to keep them in awe, they are in that condition which is called war.”\(^\text{22}\)

However, hegemonic–stability–theory should not become a self–fulfilling prophecy by furthering an attitude of après moi le deluge. One could only experiment and endeavour to thwart Ferguson’s forethought upon interpretation of Sextus Empiricus

\(^{18}\) Ferguson reasons that, ‘each of the obvious potential successors to the U.S.; E.U. and China seems to contain within it the seeds of future decline; while Islam remains a diffuse force in world politics, lacking the resources of a superpower.’ See Niall Ferguson, “Colossus: The Rise and Fall of the American Empire,” 2005 p.xxv. The EU recently enacted Ferguson’s polemic tongue upon rejecting the Constitution. The now–dead European constitution actually obliged member states to increase arms spending (Art. 40). Likewise, the document extended the task of “common defence” to include contributions to combat terrorism. Most importantly, the draft Treaty also introduced a “mutual defence clause” giving the EU an equivalent mandate to Article 5 of the NATO Treaty, opening the door for the EU to be transformed into a fully military alliance. As regards the U.N., “should the hegemony of the West disappear and should no new hegemony quickly consolidate to replace it, the future of the United Nations could readily recall the history of the League of Nations.” See Donald J. Puchala, “World Hegemony and the United Nations,” International Studies Quarterly, vol. 7, 2005 p.583.


\(^{20}\) Melvyn P. Leffler scholarly illustrates that, ‘although many contemporaries and historians defined U.S. Cold war policies in terms of containment and deterrence, America’s real strategy was to pursue a preponderance of power.’ See Melvyn P. Leffler, “9/11 and the past and future of American foreign policy,” International Affairs vol.79, 2003 p.1051.


\(^{22}\) See Michael Williams, “Hobbes and international relations: a reconsideration,” International Organization vol.50, 1996 pp.213–215. However, ‘both “Hobbes” and “anarchy” have different meanings within competing theoretical traditions. Hobbes’s most famous legacy to international relations, the “state of nature,” is grounded not in a “security dilemma” brought about by a “logic of anarchy.” Rather, it lies in much deeper questions of knowledge and legitimacy.’
who, in Against the Mathematician, tells of how the Persians had a law that on the death of their King they must practice lawlessness for the next five days inflicting horrors without retribution so that they become more trusty guardians of their king.23

Historical research illuminates that hegemony is a case against international anarchy and regional vacuums of power, in deep contrast to non–hegemonic unipolarity, where instability ‘can lead to major interstate wars as new powers arise to challenge the sole superpower.’24 Moreover, the author disputes the neo–realist conclusion that “global wars may erupt as a consequence of challenges to hegemonic control.”25 U.S. unipolar power is unlikely to trigger a full–scale, traditional balance of power response.26 What troubles the major countries about American power cannot be remedied by the classical geo–political tool of balance of power; l’équilibre, das Gleichgewicht and the construction of an alternative power bloc.27 Michael Cox demonstrates the ‘grave doubts’ of the three potential replacements.28 Put simply, it is comprehensible that the substitute to U.S. hegemony –labelled as ‘the indispensable prop of stability’29—equals a return to a pre–modern barbaric world of failed states, where inhabitants relive religious revivals, incipient anarchy and where a retreat into fortified cities is fearsome.30

To substantiate such a polemic tongue one employs an authoritative precedent from the historic wars on piracy (aside, the ‘Privateer’ s31 of the piratical age mirror the CIA financed Mujhadeen in the Soviet–Afghan conflict of the 1980’s —of which embryo’s constitute the contemporary threat).32 The authors of the classical Greek period, such as Thucydides and

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26 Samuel Huntington believes that, ‘the American hegemonic threat is less immediate and more diffuse than the prospect of imminent military conquest posed by Europeans in the past. Hence, other powers can be more relaxed about forming a coalition to counter American dominance.’ See Samuel Huntington, “The Lonely Superpower,” Foreign Affairs, March/April 1999.
30 The motion picture ‘Mad Max’ provides the scenario where survivors retreat into fortified cities. The 1995 movie ‘Waterworld’ illustrates the human race struggling to survive a futuristick dark–age on dilapidated boats and makeshift floating cities, catapulting the civilized and barbaric into an explosive Manichean war of good versus evil.
31 See Peter Earle, ‘Pirate Wars,” 2005. A ‘Privateer’ is someone on a ship commissioned by their respective government to attack the loot of shipping of the enemy country.
32 The U.S. through employing Afghan proxies to defeat the Read Army mirrored 4th Century BC Greece. The Aetolian League encouraged piracy against rival states. See Melvyn P. Leffler, “9/11 and the past and future of American foreign policy,” International Affairs vol.79, 2003 p.1051. However, Boot notes that, ‘it is tempting to compare the Barbary States to modern Islamist states that preach and
Herodotus, recurrently cite the exploits of pirates and the labour of the Greek city–
states in restraining the pirate menace. While naval activity did much to condense piracy in its eastern waters, a political void was fashioned throughout the Mediterranean in the Second Century BC. The war between Rome and Carthage to the West and the decline of the Macedonian successor states to the East allowed entire pirate communities in Cilicia and Illyria to play one power off against another.

As the command of Rome came to dictate the Mediterranean, pirate communities were steadily smashed and their territory integrated into the Roman ‘sphere of influence.’ By the foundation of the Roman Empire under Emperor Augustus, the Mediterranean was a Roman sea, and shipping was impervious from pirate molest for four centuries. However, the disintegration of the Roman Empire in the fifth century thrust that branch of the Mediterranean into anarchism, and piracy swelled the Byzantine Empire rapidly fashioning an international insecurity corollary.

Similarly, the historical imperialist tentacles of the eighteenth and nineteenth century were paralleled with piratical expiration. The intensifying reach of European empire progressively cleansed the vast repertoire of havens on which pirates sought their respiratory aid. Moreover, contemporarily speaking, there has been an alarming revival in piratical attacks, a resurgence which all too clearly reflects the maritime dangers of a post–imperial world in which the navies of the Great Powers no longer employ methods of perambulation wherever they desire.

In sum, while there is no *summum bonum* (or greatest good), there is a *summum malum* (or greatest evil) which U.S. hegemony acts as a bulwark against. Moreover, “weakness is provocative,” and Rob Singh highlights that, ‘soft power is not a power that is easily deployed by government and one of dubious utility when –for radical Islamists –it is precisely what America is, not simply what it does, that is their grievance.’ Furthermore, ‘root–and–branch critics of America’s role…literally have practice jihad against infidel unbelievers. It is a temptation best resisted. The rulers of the Ottoman Empire and North African tributaries were not particularly xenophobic nor especially fundamentalist.’ See Max Boot, “The Savage Wars of Peace: Small Wars and the Rise of American Power,” 2002 p.8.


See Craig Ross, “Hobbes on Good and Evil,” Philosopy Now, issue 54 February/March, 2006 p.31. William Kristol and Robert Kagan fundamentally comprehend that, ‘American hegemony is the only reliable defence against a breakdown of peace and international order. The appropriate goal of American foreign policy, therefore, is to preserve that hegemony as far into the future as possible. To achieve this goal, the United States needs a neo–Reaganite foreign policy of military supremacy and moral confidence.’ See William Kristol and Robert Kagan, “Toward a Neo–Reaganite Foreign Policy,” Foreign Affairs, July/August 1996.

See David Frum and Richard Perle, “And End To Evil: How to Win the War on Terror,” 2004 pp.12–16; see also the author’s manuscript, “Don’t Put
nothing constructive to offer in place of temporary American global guardianship,’ while incessantly bellowing the neo–nonsense of a revolutionary cabal residing under the floor–boards in the White House.

It is at this point that we now turn to introducing the neo–conservatives.

**Introducing the cause célèbre of international politics: myths of slogan**

The commentary bears resemblance to a Gothic horror novel, an archetypal tale of a haunted house and the evil spirits that dwell within. The chronicle of a wealthy king in a stately palace endowed with great powers, yet surrounded ‘by malevolent demonic forces manipulating him from back there in the shadows,’ fashioning what *Le Monde* term, as the ‘cretinization’ of foreign policy.

To get the reader started, clarity is afforded to ‘neo–conservatism.’ The intellectual tradition at once conservative, fiercely anti–communist and strongly pro–Israeli, had in an earlier generation, found its home in the Democratic Party. The refugees broke with the Left because of Soviet détente and Democratic hostility to Israel’s occupation of Arab land after 1967. The embryonic formulation of the term was originally fashioned as an insult to those new Right lodgers.

The neo–conservatives have become a *cause célèbre* in international politics. Despite its jarring persuasion in U.S. foreign policy however, neo–conservatism has
received comparatively little attention in International Relations (IR) theory. Neo-conservatives do not engage in academic theoretical debate within the field of IR – favouring as a surrogate to posit their estimation through an engagement with concrete issues of the day as a substitute of a more abstract theoretical formulation. Moreover, it can be argued that, “neo–conservatives seemed less interested in promoting dialogue with opponents than in demolishing them.” William Kristol in retort to accusations that neo–cons are a cabal, laconically stated “if it’s a cabal, it’s the most visible cabal ever…We write articles.” Nevertheless, listening to the repertoire of accounts, Francis Fukuyama states that one would trust that, ‘neo–conservatism was an alien spore that drifted in from outer space and infected the American body politic.’

It is difficult to characterize any non card–carrying organization, ‘to inchoate to call a movement’ in which no ideological straightjacket undergirds its affiliates without being accused of distortion. Jonah Goldberg reiterates that, ‘no neoconservative has ever contradicted James Q. Wilson’s assertion that neocons have no common “manifesto, credo or religion.”’ The distinguished scholar of U.S. foreign policy Walter Russell Mead further highlights that; the neo–conservatives cannot be shoe–horned into one of [his] four traditions. Ultimately, there is few defining attributes one can ascribe to neo–cons which cannot be easily falsified with counter–examples. However, the chief basic uniting characterization is the belief that the internal character of regimes matters to external behaviour.

Yet, screening neo–conservatives as an ideological community invites critics to treat neo–conservative thinking as a self–contained text – idée fixe, chiselled in headstone written up in a manifesto–driven ideology analogous to Marxism. Moreover, transporting the name from one assemblage to the other is a contrivance, based to a degree on sociology and connections. Yet, Stefan Halper and Jonathan Clarke treat the later neo–conservatives as organic extensions of the former ones. The academics endeavour to smooth out these rough edges by an ineffectual concentration a propos family links, publishing and think–tank affiliations. Indeed, the neo–conservatism of

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45 The author wishes to thank Michael Williams (University of Wales, Aberystwyth) for sending the sample copy: “What is the National Interest? The Neo–conservative Challenge in IR Theory,” European Journal of International Relations, vol. 11, September 2005 pp.307–337.
54 Within the past few months the neo–conservatives have lost two of their central magazines: The Public Interest and The National Interest. Writers suspicious of neo–cons have drawn elaborate flow charts to map neo–conservative influence, screening the links between journalists (such as Krauthammer and Kristol), think tanks (American Enterprise Institute ‘AEI’ and the Project for the
the early twenty-first century is not minimally a continuation of that which emerged in the 1970’s. Dorrien succinctly confirms the author’s position.

Even to speak of neoconservatism as a movement can be misleading, because neocons do not have a creed in the manner of libertarians. Neoconservatism is more of an impulse than a self-referencing movement.

The author, prior to interpreting Toenjes’s data-set encompassing webs of interlocking memberships and counteracting a neo-con strategy post-9/11, directs the reader to an article that has received comparatively modest attention—it is not cited in any works that constitute this paper’s bibliography. The author apologises in advance for, what may appear as, gluttony in extracting the article’s body. The piece written by Jonah Goldberg comprised part three of a series on neo-conservatism for the National Review. Goldberg’s premise is the daily catalogue of mutilation of the neo-con label. Of the four ‘enduring misapplications of the word’ supplied, only two will be scrutinised here:

(1) Idea that neo-con means “foreign policy hawk.”
(2) Idea that neo-con means “Jewish.”

Firstly, no one was cataloguing Donald Rumsfeld, Condoleezza Rice, Dick Cheney or John Ashcroft as ‘neo-cons’ prior to 9/11 and ‘if you were to revise previous Republican administrations, neo-con was never a stand-in for hawk either.’ This becomes ever more perplexing ‘because of the stylistic’ imprecision of those making these dissimilarities. Goldberg goes on to name ‘Joshua Marshall,’ whom in a cover story in The Washington monthly ‘is all over the map’—on occasion referring to ‘hawks’ or ‘hawkish neo-cons’ and yet in another instant, to plain old boring ‘neo-cons’ but ‘he is always talking about the exact same people.’ If ‘neo-con’ and ‘hawk’ mean the same thing—why does Marshall redundantly utter ‘hawkish neo-cons?’ Goldberg, humorously states, ‘isn’t it not like referring to “canine dogs or feline cats?”’

The second predicament with the neo-con tag is the Jew fixation. The exertion ‘with the all-too-popular’ sensitivity that muscular Judaism is running U.S. foreign policy is all too palpable. Pattern has described this as the ‘Likudisation of American

55 See John Guelke, “The Political Morality of the Neo-conservatives: An Analysis,” International Politics, vol. 42, 2005 pp.97–115. The end of the Cold War, and of the cohesive power of anti-communism, led to a reconsideration of appropriate foreign policy strategies and to the collapse of any semblance of a unitary foreign policy position amongst neo-conservatives. While some advocated the energetic pursuit of a global democratic revolution (Muravchik) others argued that with the end of the Soviet threat the U.S. should pursue a less expansive foreign policy (Kirkpatrick and Kristol).
foreign policy.’ Goldberg, conscious of conspiratorial material writes that, ‘abroad, America’s intentions are distrusted by those who see Israel,’ moreover, what Friedman coins as ‘Jewish intelligentsia,’ ‘lurking in the shadows.’ It seems a customary plot that Israel exercises an authoritative gravitational pull on Bush. However, it is bizarre to comprehend that ‘unipolarist ideology is some kind of cover for hard line Zionism.’ It is simply atypical that individuals work their way to the top echelons of U.S. foreign policy apparatus by advocating the security of another state mistaking Tel Aviv for the “capital of the United States.”

On the other hand, one does concede that a number of high-ranking members of the Bush administration were members of the Jewish Institute for National Security Affairs (JINSA), namely: Dick Cheney, John Bolton, Douglas Feith and Richard Perle. This affiliation could appear fundamental to U.S. foreign policy when measured in Laurence Toenjes’s data-set below.

Toenjes’s innovative research illustrates that a relatively diminutive assemblage of individuals associated with think-tanks could have achieved disproportionate influence over policy formulation. The investigation encompassed the activities of fourteen organizations which were coordinated by persons who comprised a web of inter-locking memberships. Toenjes quantifies the inter-linked character of the 14 organizations by cross-tabulating individuals with memberships in two or more societies: for example; Perle was associated with 10 of the 14. In sum, Toenjes’s statistical data illuminates 223 links between the 14 groups, ‘where a link is defined as the association of a single individual with two organizations.’ In all, 650 individuals allied with the 14 organizations were integrated in the study; however, just 9 individuals formed 121 of the inter-group links, ‘accounting for over half of the total.’ The corollary was such ‘concentration of the inter-group linkages suggests

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63 *Ibid*. pp.135, 216. Pat Robertson’s “The New World Order,” described a conspiracy to take over society led by a secret Jewish cabal, founded in 1776 by European bankers including the Rothschilds whose aim was creating havoc. However, inconveniently for Marxist [and Robertson’s] theory, there is scarcely any evidence that these interests made businessmen desire war. In London the overwhelming majority of bankers were appalled at the prospect, not least because war threatened to bankrupt most if not all the major acceptance houses engaged in financing international trade.’ Moreover, ‘the Rothschilds strove vainly to avert an Anglo–German conflict, and for their plans were accused by the foreign editor of *The Times*, of a “dirty German–Jewish international financial attempt to bully us into advocating neutrality.”’ See Niall Ferguson, “The Pity of War,” 1998 p.32.
65 *Ibid*. p.9. From the data, ‘it is observed that Richard Perle accounts for 45 linkages among the 10 organizations with which he is associated. Thus, fully 20 percent of the personal ties linking these 14 organizations, as represented by our data set, are attributable to this one individual.’
66 *Ibid*. p.4. Toenjes states that, ‘the goal is to quantify the pattern of linkages among the selected organizations that results when many individuals are associated with two or more of them. For example, if person 1 is a member of organization A and organization B, then organizations A and B are said to be linked by that individual. It is assumed that the greater the number of persons with common memberships in a specific pair of organizations the more closely they are linked and therefore the greater the degree of mutual influence, coordination and common purpose between the two organizations.’
67 *Ibid*. p.9 ‘The top nine individuals, in terms of numbers of organizational affiliations, account for 121 linkages, which comprises 54 percent of the total number of 223.’
that a small number of individuals could effectively influence and coordinate the foreign policy impact of these organizations.'

The preceding statistics afford clarity that neo–con think–tank intellects could have enjoyed the Presidents ear, chiefly for the reason of their unabashed pro–American stance. Moreover, one must question the intellectual void exposed after 9/11, wherein such altruism, branded in its most palatable form had been digested by the American electorate. However, it is tempting to interpret the Project for the New American Century’s authority as the Rosetta Stone of the Bush administration fashioned by the nexus of the sprawling neo–con tentacles.” 68 This temptation is best resisted: albeit the statistical evidence indicates neo–conservative inter–locking memberships –the president was neither an empty–vassal nor a neo–conservative ideologue. It is this validation that comprises the bedrock of third theme.

Before which however, in counteracting a neo–con strategy post–9/11 let us examine the three chief policies at the centre of Bush’s foreign policy.

(1) Going to war in Afghanistan.
(2) Going to war in Iraq.
(3) Attempting to achieve democracy rather than merely stability in post–war Afghanistan/Iraq.

The first decision, war in Afghanistan was virtually unopposed when made and even today receives little second–guessing.69 The Taliban defied the Monroe Doctrine and sponsored murder in America’s own hemisphere –eliminating any fundamental neo–con manufacturing.70 Moreover, Afghanistan’s sovereignty was an obligation as well as an entitlement. A government that will not perform the role of a government forfeits the rights of a government. The Barbary States that terrorized U.S. shipping during the Jefferson administration were theoretically provinces of the Ottoman Empire; however, the Ottomans did not stop their piracy so the U.S. had to do the job instead.71

Secondly, the election to battle in Iraq is an additional matter. However, viewing the resolution as the product of neo–conservatism requires assuming away a primary stated reason for going to war: the belief that Iraq possessed WMD.72 If the Bush administration genuinely believed that Iraq possessed WMD, neo–conservatism cannot be considered a prerequisite for favouring war.73 Indeed, Clinton supported by

70 See David Frum and Richard Perle, “And End To Evil: How to Win the War on Terror,” 2004 p.3.
71 Ibid., p.102.
73 Dorrien stresses that, ‘they were undoubtedly sincere in believing that Saddam possessed large stockpiles of them (WMD).’ See Gary Dorrien, ‘Imperial Designs: Neoconservatism and the New Pax Americana,’ 2004 p.10. President Bush had to ask himself: ‘If I remove Saddam and learn later that he did not have WMD after all, how would that compare to leaving him in place –and learning only after he used them, or enabled terrorists to use them, that he did in fact possess the chemical and biological weapons that all Western intelligence organizations as well as U.N. inspectors believed him to have
high ranking officials in the Democrat camp seriously measured going to war with Iraq over its WMD program in 1998 three years prior to 9/11. If WMD could cause a liberal party to take the U.S. to the brink of war in a pre–9/11 environment it would have led the same liberal over the brink of war consigning to the rubbish bin of history his administration’s ‘doctrine of benign inactivity.’

The Clinton administration, analogous to the existing administration, believed it had the right to insist that a sovereign state not develop nuclear weapons on its own territory. Administration official William Perry understands that the policy the Clinton team pursued toward North Korea in 1994 was cut from the same cloth as the Bush strategy.

Thirdly, what of the decision to endeavour to bring about a democratic Afghanistan and Iraq after disposing of the Wahhabist Taliban and Fascist Saddam? The non neo–con Thomas Freidman invoked the “Pottery Barn Rule” –and the ethos–“You break it, you own it,” by which he meant that once the coalition conquered Afghanistan/Iraq it was their obligation to ensure its good governance.

Freidman’s formulation highlights a key distinction: it is ‘revolutionary’ to invade a country for the purpose of making it democratic; it is customary –not revolutionary–to promote democracy in a country that has been invaded for other reasons.

The instrumentalization of pro–democracy policies, wrapping security goals in the tongue of a democratization nexus that overturn the status–quo are neither ‘revolutionary’ nor ‘neo–conservative.’

The neo–con conspiracy theories: ‘Czarina Bush’ and ‘neo–divergence.’

The remnants of Saddam Hussein’s crushed totalitarianism may one day; grant corroboration of weaponry of mass destruction, but one venomous by–product has already oozed from under the debris. In an essay appearing in The New Statesman,
Michael Lind adopts overtly conspiratorial language professing the ‘alarming’ reality that the foreign policy of the world’s solitary global authority has been ‘hijacked’ by a baleful and hitherto esoteric cabal.77

Lind’s ink denotes that the president may not yet be cognisant of what this ‘cult’ has foisted upon him. In his words, ‘it is not clear that George W. fully comprehends the grand strategy that Wolfowitz and other aides are unfolding.’78 Therein, it is additionally rumoured that, ‘he seems genuinely to believe that there was an imminent threat to the U.S. from Saddam’s weapons of mass destruction (WMD), something the leading neo-cons say in public but are far too intelligent to believe themselves.’

Lind’s supposition erroneously presumes that Bush himself is an empty vassal, a latter-day equivalent of Czarina Alexandra, somehow fallen under the influence of Rasputin/Wolfowitz: what the author terms ‘Czarina Bush.’ Disparagement toward Bush has been a hallmark of liberal and leftist discourse ever since the disputed 2000 presidential election, and there can be few readers of this manuscript who have not heard tête-à-tête that did not begin with offhand dismissals of him as stupid or as insane as King George III.79

Upon eliminating the ‘Czarina Bush’ thesis one could alternatively pay heed to Daalder and Lindsay’s posture: that the President is the ‘true revolutionary,’ that he was more the ‘puppeteer’ than the ‘puppet’ he is portrayed as.80 Additionally, Time magazine named Bush “An American Revolutionary” in 2004.81 The conclusion is based on two credible arguments though does not expose a ‘revolutionary’ stature. First, Bush has very strong convictions about U.S. engagement with the world – reaffirmed by September 11th not transformed by it.82 Secondly, he has approached the

80 See Ivo Daalder and James Lindsay, “America Unbound: The Bush Revolution in Foreign Policy,” 2003 p. 16.
81 See Nancy Gibbs and John Dickerson, “Person of the Year,” Time Magazine, December 2004.
82 The author wishes to thank Paul Lyons for sending a copy of his manuscript, “George W. Bush’s City on a Hill,” The Journal of The Historical Society, vol.6 March 2006 p. 119. Lyons notes that, ‘those defending the President, not only take his liberating rhetoric at face value, but also contend that it is consistent with a long–term American idealism going back to the notion of a City on a Hill for all the world to see—and emulate. His supporters challenge those who see Bush policy as a violation of long–term American views of our role in the world;’ See also Patrick J. Haney, “Foreign–Policy
presidency much like a corporation, where he is chief executive officer (CEO) (implementing his experience from Harvard Business School) who is very much in charge. Though “process dependent” relying on his team to give him the unsurpassed counsel; execution of the decisions he ‘loves to make’ were his alone to formulate.83

Dorrien recapitulates the common tale, that “the neoconservatives put their precooked meal in front of him [and] Bush dug into it.” In retort, the ink of Carole Bell states—though initially jotted for Reagan is adopted here for the existing president—the ‘hot soup of declaratory policy as it emerges from the kitchen of ideological cooks who prepared it is always cooled a little by pragmatism.’84

A president has got to be the calcium in the backbone, if I weaken the whole team weakens. If I’m doubtful, I can assure you there will be a lot of doubt.85

George W. Bush

His unphilosophical temperament makes him unresponsive to complexity but rapid to move toward resolution, permitting him to progress swiftly from pronouncement to their execution and leaves him obstinate in staying the course once decisions are engaged. David Frum and Richard Perle rightly speak out that much of the world decided in 2002 that it no longer desired to fight the war on terror. This caused the ‘disheartened’ to ‘resent those who did want to keep fighting.’ Because of ‘liberal disdain for Bush, it simply could not accept that it was the president’s determination that was pushing the war forward. Somebody else had to be responsible.’ The corollary of which was the revolutionary cabbalist seizure of foreign policy.

Though in concurrence with Daalder and Lindsay’s character premise, there are reservations in relation to their ‘revolutionary’ theme. Ironically, the study’s supreme weak–point lies in its endeavour to clarify just where the ‘revolutionary’ fervour came from.86 Staring at preceding administrations dealings with intercontinental challenges, one observes the true ‘maximalist’ tradition of their diplomacy.87


85 See Michael J. Mazzar, “George W. Bush, Idealist,” International Affairs vol.79, 2005 p.517; see also Peter Bondanella, “Niccolo Machiavelli: The Prince,” 2005, p.xxix. Bondanella translates the ‘might that a prince [president] must possess to be secure has to be such that it permits him to defend his state without anybody’s help.’


87 See Francis Fukuyama, “After the Neocons: America at the Crossroads,” 2006 pp.99–100. American maximalism is ‘a pattern that was established at the beginning of the Cold War wherein Americans consistently pushed for goals that were more ambitious and outside the boundaries of conventional
administration has deposited its personal stamp on this custom; it did not originate it. ‘Maximalism’ is the modern American norm.88 Daalder and Lindsay must comprehend that advancing national interests by overturning a deteriorating status quo is not ‘revolutionary.’89 It has been the recurring practice of U.S. diplomacy for decades. It is for this reason that the author too dismisses the ‘Revolutionary Bush’ narrative.

Before packaging the third theme, the author wishes to attend to the conflation of the two conservative blocs undergirding Bush’s foreign policy. Charles Krauthammer views the Bush administration’s foreign policy as the artefact of a convergence of neo–cons and mainstream pragmatic conservatives.90 Both neo–cons and their enemies have an enticement to christen this convergence neo–conservative; or what can be termed ‘neo–convergence.’ However, the conflation and ‘political cross–dressing’ of these two conservative blocs serves to conceal what the author terms: ‘neo–divergence.’91

Steven Hurst of Manchester Metropolitan University is exact in concluding ‘that neo–conservatives want to do all they can in their powers to complete the global democratic revolution…while the conservative nationalists put themselves the more modest task of keeping the world safe for freedom.’92 Hurst, further scholarly propagates the continuity of nationalist conservative dogma after 9/11 upon dissecting the National Security Strategy (NSS) in relation to ‘democracy promotion’—emphasizing the tepid and controlled phrases ‘when openings arise, we encourage change.’


89 Bush did use his strength to transform the status quo. Indeed, the Bush philosophy turned John Quincy Adams (J.Q.A.) on his head and argued that the U.S. should aggressively go abroad in searching for monsters to destroy. However, Wilson’s liberal internationalism turned J.Q.A.’s creed on its head too —some nine decades previously. See Ivo Daalder and James Lindsay, “America Unbound: The Bush Revolution in Foreign Policy,” 2003 pp.6, 13.


91 Daalder and Lindsay illustrate this conservative marriage. ‘Although neoconservatives and assertive conservatives differed on whether the U.S. should actively spread its values abroad, they shared a deep scepticism of traditional Wilsonianism. They placed their faith not in diplomacy and treaties, but in power and resolve. Agreement on this key point allowed neoconservatives and assertive nationalist conservatives to form a marriage of convenience in overthrowing the cold–war approach to foreign policy even as they disagreed about what kind of commitment the U.S. should make to rebuilding Iraq and remaking the rest of the world.’ See Ivo Daalder and James Lindsay, “America Unbound: The Bush Revolution in Foreign Policy,” 2003 p.16. The term ‘political cross–dressing’ is taken from PM Blair’s speech to the Foreign Policy Centre, 21st March 2006.

The most telling phrase in Bush’s democracy promotion rhetoric, however, is ‘a balance of power that favours freedom.’ Such a balance, Bush declared in his prelude to the NSS, would create ‘conditions in which all nations can choose for themselves the rewards and challenges of political and economic liberty.’ Conversely, Melvyn Leffler posits that such a ‘balance’ is an abnormal approach to meeting unprecedented danger. Leffler highlights that, ‘it is also a confused approach. A balance of power envisions equilibrium, while the Bush administration yearns for hegemony.’ However, with such a ‘balance’ in this instance, Bush comprehensibly rebutted a ‘neo–Reaganite foreign policy,’ choreographed by messers Kristol–Kagan and according to Francis Fukuyama, ‘downplayed its dominance.’ Fukuyama masters how the U.S. ought to exercise its power in the modern unipolar age in accordance with Otto von Bismarck’s historical model:

Bismarck launched two wars…to unify Germany and secure a dominant position in central Europe. After this had been achieved by 1871, however, he understood that Germany’s main task would be to reassure its intimidated and resentful neighbours that Germany had become a status quo power. His clear goal was to prevent the formation of hostile coalitions that would openly oppose German power. The administration’s pre–war goal was to do unerringly analogous to Afghanistan’s post–war activity by rapidly handing over the nation–building effort to the international community. It was prohibited from doing so simply by the magnitude of the post–war Iraqi struggle. In November 2003, Rumsfeld gave a television interview saying that, ‘it’s their country…we’re not going to provide security in their country over a prolonged period of time.’ At a matching instance, the Department of Defence announced plans to cut U.S. troop personnel in Iraq by 20 per cent. These conservative nationalist announcements were damned by neo–conservatives who condemned the ‘unwillingness by American leaders to shoulder the necessary military burden in Iraq’–illuminating this ‘neo–divergence.’

The conservative nationalist doctrine ‘to make the world safe for democracy’ is not merely a ‘revolutionary’ policy aimed at dealing with a specific problem; here for the first time in more than a century was a revivalist doctrine designed to serve as a universal principal. Moreover, Singh analogous to Mead, scholarly states that ‘Jacksonianism and Wilsonianism had been melded into a new hybrid, one unafraid to project American power or American values –indeed, one that saw the combination as inextricably linked for the preservation of American security.’

This theme has questioned the two dissimilar theses comprising the make–up of Bush and his ‘conservative’ foreign policy. The author rejects the two uniformly: ‘Czarina Bush’ and ‘Revolutionary Bush,’ seeing the president rather, as a proficient CEO who regulates the turnstile of the ‘conservative’ supporters.

The ‘neo–divergence’ breakdown has typified that, while Bush’s foreign policy was endorsed by both conservative blocs, conservative nationalism was indubitably the foremost influence. Most important, it has been verified that this lingered even after the September 2001 attacks. Bush’s policies confirmed a fundamental continuity. Closer inspection of his declarations on democracy promotion reveals an essentially conservative nationalist commitment to a ‘balance of power’ rather than hands–on nation–building. That was confirmed by the rationales offered for the war against Iraq, which were essentially as analogous to those offered in 1999 and 2000 and not ‘revolutionary.’

Foreign policy precedents and prevention

Ultimately, the neo–con conspiracy theory misinterprets as a policy coup a reasoned shift in grand strategy that the Bush administration has adopted in responding to an ominous form of external threat. In reality, John Lewis Gaddis stresses that, ‘U.S. safety comes from enlarging, rather than contracting, America’s spheres of responsibilities.’ To characterize expansionist designs that guarantee security in such conspiratorial lexis is not only a failure to weigh policy choices on their merits, but represents a detour into the fever swamps of political demagoguery.

It was former President John Q. Adams (J.Q.A.) (1825–1829), and not a ‘Jewish cabal’ who innovatively fashioned the method by which expansionism ought to be realized in affording security. Therefore, the Bush administration has chased Adams’s trail in calling for another expansion of the sphere of liberty; it can no longer respect the sovereignty of any states that harbours terrorists; it must prevent such threats wherever they appear; and will extend democracy far and wide.

Wilsonians comprehended the opportunities to extract a totalitarian regime and lay democratic seeds; see also Francis Fukuyama, “After the Neocons: America at the Crossroads,” 2006 pp.7–8.

Scott Bennett and Allan Stam ‘in assessing the war’s length in March 2003 applied a previous statistical model to the U.S.–Iraq war in making an informed prediction of the war’s duration.” This model estimated the effect of a variety of factors on the duration of interstate wars between 1816 and 1992 (80 wars). Developing the model from the calculating the conventional war the pair now analysed the duration of a guerrilla war. Their conclusion reads that such a guerrilla/ punishment war would last 7 years (83 months). See D. Scott Bennett and Allan C. Stam, “Predicting the Length of the 2003 U.S.–Iraq War,” Foreign Policy Analysis vol.2, 2006 101–116.


Ibid., p.15. The most influential grand strategist of the nineteenth century whose accomplishments as Secretary of State under President James Monroe far outweighed those of his own subsequent one–term presidency.

What happened after September 11th was that you now had one of these Pearl Harbour moments when the America people are in their Jacksonian mood. See Robert Kagan, “Paradise and Power: America and Europe in the New World Order,” 2003 p.96.


Bush Doctrine exhibiting its democratic tentacles is a corollary to the Eisenhower Doctrine (1957) declaring that the U.S. would distribute economic and military aid and, wherever necessary, propel military force in discontinuing the swell of anti-democratic ideology in the Middle Eastern expanses.106

Paradoxically, the precedent J.Q.A set has ultimately fashioned what he warned against: an American government that deliberately goes abroad in search of “monsters to destroy.”107 It is here then, that the Adams legacy and the Bush strategy part company, for such a quest, Adams feared would make the U.S. the ‘dictatress of the world.’ However, H.W. Brands ‘has captured its century–old flavour of modernity by linking it to George W. Bush’s post–9/11 doctrine: “In 1904…Theodore Roosevelt issued a statement claiming for the U.S. the right to act unilaterally and, if necessary, pre–emptively, to maintain order.”108

A surprise terrorist attack is the midwife who expedites the birth of new orders and in this case the midwife’s instruments were those created by the Victorian ‘annihilation of distance.’ The events of September 11th greatly accelerated the administration’s readiness to re–think Cold War ideals of (inter)national security.110 Thus, in a new–fangled age, where old forms of deterrence about threats no longer hold, it was up to Bush to impose a structure of peace.111

The widespread celebration of the quality of deterrence strategies in retrospect is perhaps most pertinent today for how it illuminates precisely those conditions that no

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106 See Peter L. Hahn, “Securing the Middle East: The Eisenhower Doctrine of 1957,” Political Studies Quarterly, vol.26, March 2006 pp.38–47. The Eisenhower Doctrine ‘left a major legacy in U.S. diplomatic history. In the context of the Middle East, it signalled a growing American willingness to accept responsibility for the security and stability of the Middle East.’ Furthermore, the Eisenhower Doctrine provided another building block for the foundation of American pre–eminence in the region.’


108 The Economist notes, the U.S. ‘bestrides the globe like a colossus,’ in “America’s World,” 1999; see also Niall Ferguson, “Colossus: The Rise and Fall of the American Empire,” 2005 p.68.


110 See James Mann, “Rise of the Vulcans” 2004 p.314. In [the summer of] 2001 ‘the administration took its first big step toward abandoning the rules and restrictions of the cold war when President Bush announced that the U.S. would withdraw from the ABM Treaty. That agreement he said, “was written in a different era, for a different enemy;”’ see also Benjamin Barber, “Fear’s Empire: War, Terrorism and Democracy,” 2004 p.107.

111 See Robert Jervis, “American Foreign Policy in a New Era,” 2005 p.84; see also Halper and Clarke, “America Alone,” 2002 p.143. Given ‘the goals of rogue states and terrorists the U.S. can no longer solely rely on a reactive posture as…in the past.’
longer exist.\textsuperscript{112} Now instead of symmetrical conflicts, it is asymmetrical ones that haunt policymakers.\textsuperscript{113} With great powers less inclined to threaten each other, threats are more likely to come from far weaker powers, which might be inclined to use unconventional means to compensate for their inferior conventional military capabilities.\textsuperscript{114} Though the author has reservations about the usefulness of the ‘rogue state’ label as a category of analysis when considering conventional military aggressiveness, it is empirically contested that these states pursue WMD/state–sponsorship of terrorism as a substitute for conventional conflict behaviour.\textsuperscript{115}

When a terrorist group is known to exist but is inoperative, the rules for just anticipation do apply. This would be considered just prevention as the concept of “imminence” becomes virtually impossible to establish given a world in which terrorists operate by surprise and can strike at any place, at any time.\textsuperscript{116} While defensive measures can play some role in deterring this, the rise of the suicide bomber further exacerbates the problem. A nation must have the right to afford itself with some level of protection without having to overcome the sometimes unachievable chore of verifying that an inevitable attack is coming in days or weeks.\textsuperscript{117}

Krauthammer reached for a Cold War expression: we have just witnessed something new in the modern world: the rollback of Islamic fundamentalism. For thirty years the West tried to contain Islamic terrorism just as it tried to contain communism. Just as the Reagan doctrine reversed containment and marked the beginning of the end of the Soviet empire, the Bush doctrine marks the beginning of the rollback of the Islamic terror empire.\textsuperscript{118}

Despite witnessing ‘something new in the modern world,’ advancing national interests by overturning a deteriorating ‘status quo’ is not ‘revolutionary,’ but rather Bush has implemented his forefather’s ‘rollback’ precedent.

\textsuperscript{112} See Mary Buckley and Rob Singh (ed.), “The Bush Doctrine and the War on Terrorism,” 2006 p.18.
\textsuperscript{113} See Steven Lambakis, “Reconsidering Asymmetrical Warfare,” Joint Force Quarterly issue thirty-six p.102. Asymmetry typically describes an enemy that thinks of acts differently from America, especially when faced with conventionally superior U.S. forces.
\textsuperscript{114} See Lawrence Freedman, “Prevention. Not Pre–emption,” The Washington Quarterly, spring 2003 p.110; see also John Urry, “The Global Complexities of September 11th,” Theory, Culture and Society, vol.19 2002 pp.61–62. Singh highlights America’s adversaries’ incentive to acquire WMD to deter a U.S. attack or engagement in asymmetric warfare. Moreover, it is deeply ironic that the very preponderance of American power provides such incentives, ‘it is nonetheless naïve to imagine that a reduction in such power would yield a preferable alternative.’ See Mary Buckley and Rob Singh (ed.), “The Bush Doctrine and the War on Terrorism,” 2006 p.25.
\textsuperscript{116} See Terence Taylor, “The End of Imminence,” The Washington Quarterly, vol. 27 September 2004 pp.57–72; see also David Frum and Richard Perle, “And End To Evil: How to Win the War on Terror,” 2004 p.29. Frum and Perle ask, ‘even if we could predict dangers more accurately than we can, what benefit do we gain from waiting for a threat to become more imminent?’
Whatever one thinks of that argument, the expansion of American power in response to surprise having no historical precedents: a nation that began with the belief that it could not be safe as long as pirates and the agents of predatory empires remained active along its borders has now taken the position that it cannot be secure as long as tyrants and terrorists remain active anywhere in the world. That conclusion indubitably reflects prudence: where the nation’s security is at risk, one can hardly be too vigilant.

The roots of Bush’s foreign policy, and in particular its emphasis on prevention, can be traced to John Locke’s Second Treatise, in which he argued that in their defence people must take action before ‘It is too late, and the evil is past cure.’

A Lockean mode of politics is almost hyper–vigilant against tyranny. One might suggest, admittedly at the risk of some over generalisation that, in moving against Iraq, the Bush administration simply reflected aspects of the political psychology embodied in Locke’s Second Treatise, prevention in foreign policy is perhaps written into their political DNA.

The Bush administration did not invent revolutionary ‘preventive’ strikes nor the need to ‘rescue the world’ from tyranny as justification for preventive strikes. In so far as the Bush Doctrine becoming a philosophy for foreign policy, it is one with deep roots in British state thinking and practice. Interestingly, there has been little discussion about the connection between the Bush administration’s vision of preventive warfare and the revised strategic concept of NATO. Many European states have pushed this notion off the table without earnest dialogue despite the fact that its roots lie in the thoroughly legitimate ‘precautionary principle.’

The National Security Strategy (NSS) doctrine has two principal features: (1) a war on terror of global reach against terrorist organizations and; (2) the targeting of rogue states that possess WMD. In the introduction to the document, President Bush informed the world of the final phase of the U.S. evolution on preventive war: the U.S. will act to prevent ‘emerging threats before they are fully formed.’

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119 Puchala’s study makes clear: ‘the activities of pirates menacing the world historically are analogous to those international terrorists menacing the world today.’ Among the historical strategies of anti–piracy have evolved what we term into today’s parlance: ‘homeland security.’ See Donald Puchala, ‘Of Pirates and Terrorists: What Experience and History can Teach,’ Contemporary Security Policy vol. 26 April 2005 pp.1, 19; see also Robert Kagan, “Paradise and Power: American and Europe in the New World Order,” 2003 p. 30. Kagan historically recalls that, ‘the U.S. in its formative decades lived in a state of substantial insecurity, surrounded by hostile European empires on the North American continent, at constant risk of being torn apart by centrifugal forces that were encouraged by threats from without.’

120 Prevention is the ethos of Lockean liberal politics. ‘An ounce of prevention is better than a pound of cure’ is as good a motto for foreign policy as it is for medicine. See Lawrence Freedman, “Prevention, not Pre–emption,” The Washington Quarterly, spring 2003 p.114.


123 However, therein there are four pillars: the maintenance of American military primacy; the embrace of preventive war as a supplement to traditional deterrence; the war on terrorism; and democratization. See Mary Buckley and Rob Singh (ed.), “The Bush Doctrine and the War on Terrorism,” 2006 p.4.
The NSS is an absorbing tour d’horizon of the Bush administration’s inspection of international security that has parallels, and an ‘eerie resonance with the “war on drugs”’ promoted by Bush senior. Alastair Finlan succinctly illuminates Bush junior’s imitation of his father’s policy:

First and foremost, the document has echoes of his father’s idea of a ‘new world order’ set out in 1990. It argues that ‘The U.S. national security strategy will be based on a distinctly American internationalism that reflects the union of our values and our national interests.’ It is a truly global vision of security and one that clearly identifies the threat from ‘failing’ states and ‘catastrophic technologies in the hands of the embittered few.’

In the strategy document, the two categories of menace were pooled as a sort of amalgamated enemy, combining the worst features of Saddam and Bin Laden. Saddam, for example had a state and a conniving nature, in addition to severe mercilessness and an undoubted allure with all forms of destructive utensils. As the evidence that the two had yet come together is borderline –at best, an argument for action was prevention rather than pre-emption.

The yearning to thwart the materialization of such an amalgam enemy helps to elucidate the argument, found in the NSS that the concept of “imminence,” upon which the grounds for pre-emption are based, needs to be reassessed. Lawrence Freedman stresses that, ‘recognizing that prevention is at issue here –not pre-emption –is key.’

However, Finlan dispels this ‘threatening fog of strategic worst-case scenario:’

It demands a suspension of belief that, having spent vast resources on developing these weapons on a covert basis, a rogue state will just ‘give’ one of these great power status bombs to a ragtag terrorist group. These worst-case assumptions without the vital balancing caveats offer a frightening portrait of the future that bears little relation to the actual strategic situation.

Varied historical records indicate that the U.S. has never, to date, engaged in a ‘pre-emptive’ military attack against another nation. Though initially of such a persuasion one must concede it ‘is not a new concept,’ conscious of ‘pre-emptive imperialism’– thwarting prospective European interventions pronounced in the Roosevelt Corollary. However, one can contest that in the diverse instances of the use of military force by the U.S., such military action was a ‘response,’ after the fact, and

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126 Ibid., p.153. However, one of the suspected terrorists on trial for allegedly plotting a nationwide bombing campaign has been linked to a nuclear weapon. The Old Bailey jury, in London, was told that Salahuddin Amin had been involved in discussions to buy a nuclear bomb. The prosecution said contact had been made with the Russian mafia in Belgium, from whom they wanted to buy a radio-isotope bomb: visit http://www.sky.com/skynews/article/0,,30000-1216187,00.html. 22nd March 2006.
was not ‘pre-emptive’ in nature. The author terms these ‘reactionary preventive strikes(s)’ which reigns over an upshot lower-threshold.

The author envisions a restricted doctrine that holds that preventive wars are permissible against rogue states where a rogue state is one whose policies and past-track record make it overwhelmingly probable that it is arming with belligerent intentions. The restricted ‘doctrine of reactionary prevention’ would permit preventive war launched by victims and potential targets of rogue states’ behaviour. It has been the author’s unremitting philosophy that, in this post–September 11th milieu, a preventive war against a rogue state is morally related to pre-emptive war against imminent attack—what can be termed: post–9/11 hypervigilant pseudo–pre-emption.

The scope of its [Doctrine] departure from previous U.S. policies and its relevance to the post–9/11 international system remains strongly contested. While some critics have alternatively celebrated and censured the Doctrine as a ‘revolution’ in American foreign policy, others discern substantial elements of continuity with prior—-and, in all likelihood, successor administrations’ approaches to international affairs and the imperative of American global primacy.

Professor Robert Singh

The author’s penultimate point comprises the chief historical parallel to the Bush Doctrine, highlighted by way of H.W. Brands.

In 1898, following what was far and wide understood to have been a terrorist attack on the American warship Maine, President William McKinley asked Congress for a declaration of war against Spain. McKinley like Bush, had been elected some months earlier after a campaign in which foreign policy deliberation was almost non-existent.

In confident respects the Bush Doctrine was nothing more than the Roosevelt Corollary ‘adapted to an age of globalism.’ The Roosevelt Corollary had been premised on the design that instability in the Western Hemisphere endangered U.S. security. The Bush Doctrine established that the hazard to the U.S. had gone global. “The United States of America is fighting a war against terrorists of global reach,” Bush’s NSS stated. The enemies of the U.S. were at large in every part of the world: “South America, Europe, Africa, the Middle East, and across Asia.” The American response must be equally global and mirrors a Rooseveltian “police power.”

The author, in conclusion wishes to echo to the immeasurable integer of conspiracy theorists pronouncing the execution of a revolutionary foreign policy (2001–2004), the words of the 2002 Oscar–winning movie: “A Beautiful Mind,” where Alicia said to

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129 The U.S. has suffered surprise attacks of which all justify ‘reactionary preventive’ action: these were in 1812 (The burning of the White House); 1898 (The sinking of the U.S.S Marine); 1915 (The sinking of the Lusitania); 1941 (The attack of Pearl Harbour); 1964 (U.S.S Maddox torpedoed –Gulf of Tonkin); 1993 (World Trade Centre bombing ‘WTC’); 1998 (Bombing of U.S. Embassies in Kenya and Tanzania); 2000 (U.S.S. Cole attacked)and; 2001 (WTC and Pentagon attacks).


her husband, John Nash, ‘there’s no conspiracy…it’s all in your mind.’ Ultimately, Singh parallel to Leffler, stresses that the Bush Doctrine, ‘exhibits more continuity than change with the sweep of U.S. foreign relations through 200 years.’

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