

## **US Public Diplomacy and the New American Studies: *No Logo***

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This article comments on the vulnerabilities of US public diplomacy brought on by the shifting international political context from the Cold War to the post-Cold War era. In doing so, it comments on the possibilities for a New American Studies as an independent movement separate from any public diplomacy agenda.

### **Public Diplomacy: The Cold War Paradigm**

The Cold War paradigm for US public diplomacy was orientated around total information control. As Nick Cull has summed it up, it represented “the attempt by one government to manage international relations by advocacy, communication, or cultural and exchange work directed at the public sphere of a foreign state.”<sup>1</sup> It is true that sufficient resources were never granted to achieve this, but this should not obscure the fact that control was the aim.

In simple terms, public diplomacy can be divided up into two broad streams.<sup>2</sup> The first represents those tools used to promote advocacy for a specific political cause. These are generally orientated towards a short-term impact, and involve a one-way transaction in projecting a message to explain and justify foreign policy goals. The prime means to carry this out during the Cold War was through radio broadcasting such as the Voice of America and Radio Free Europe / Radio Liberty, but information films and (satellite) television were also of great importance. The second refers to the processes of cultural communication which, over the longer term, are used to raise awareness and understanding of the cultural attributes of the nation abroad. In contrast to political advocacy, these processes have more of an intention to engage with foreign audiences and initiate a two-way dialogue. Prime examples

of these methods are the use of exchange programmes and, of particular relevance here, the promotion of American Studies outside of the United States.

The ideological background to this Cold War paradigm was provided by Liberalism and the belief in the gradual solidification of peaceful relations between nations through increasing contacts and political and economic interdependence. This was generally expressed in the public diplomacy literature as the aim to achieve ‘mutual understanding’ between peoples. Thus the fundamental legislation for this approach, the 1948 Information and Educational Exchange Act (Smith-Mundt), stated its objectives as

to promote a better understanding of the United States in other countries, and to increase mutual understanding between the people of the United States and the people of other countries.<sup>3</sup>

The main point about this approach was that it assumed the benefits were self-explanatory and universally applicable. The expansion of the ‘liberal ecumene’ and the democratic zone of peace could only be in the general interest of all.<sup>4</sup> It is noteworthy in this sense that the origins of the term ‘public diplomacy’ date back to the late 19<sup>th</sup> and early twentieth centuries when it was used in relation to ‘open diplomacy’ and the outlawing of hidden agendas and secret treaties.<sup>5</sup>

Of course, the search for ‘mutual understanding’ was hardly a neutral process. The drive to achieve this community values rested solidly on assumptions of the United States itself as the source and representation of universal values. US exceptionalism ensured that it was not bound by conventional notions of the nation-state in its interests, activity, or goals, giving it a special claim on freedom of action and legitimacy that no other international actor could justify. The United States set itself up as the role model for others, and its international leadership in all realms of endeavour was sanctified through the export of its knowledge economy to those in need of assistance on the road to modernity. In the liberal ‘market-place of ideas’, the US proclaimed a monopoly stake.<sup>6</sup> As Under-Secretary of State Sumner Welles stated in 1942, during discussions on the purposes and goals of a post-war US information programme:

Should a true cultural relations program be used to implement the foreign policy of any one country; or should it provide a vehicle for the interchange of ideas and the deepening of understanding in order to aid people in the determination of their destiny?<sup>7</sup>

Welles' statement encapsulates the boundaries of the debate: Either cultural relations would be at the service of foreign policy, or it would provide the means for others to proceed towards a destiny *as laid out by the United States*.

This double-meaning is evident in all the major literature on US public diplomacy and soft power. In commenting on the value of soft or 'co-optive power', Joseph Nye identified it as setting up, in the style of mutual understanding, 'an attraction to shared values and the justness and duty of contributing to the achievement of those values'. Yet within a short space he goes beneath the general interest:

The ability to shape what others want can rest on the attractiveness of one's culture and values or the ability to manipulate the agenda of political choices in a manner that makes others fail to express some preferences because they seem to be too unrealistic.<sup>8</sup>

Others have commented on the full implications of this expansion of the 'liberal ecumene'. Frank Ninkovich has gone so far as to talk of 'anti-cultural relations':

The desire to break down cultural barriers is hardly innocuous or innocent. Whatever their actual impact, it is difficult to imagine a foreign policy activity that is more serious, even subversive, in intent....They might, more precisely, have been called *anticultural* relations.... Cultural internationalists are asking people to reconsider who and what they are, to cast their identities into doubt, and to question their traditional values...<sup>9</sup>

If this was the mission, then the right techniques were required to implement it. The awareness that governments should invest in influencing foreign publics is largely a 20<sup>th</sup> century phenomenon, and this development grew out of two principal causes. Firstly, the struggle between the competing ideologies of communism, fascism, and capitalist democracy required a defence of the national interest in the information sphere as much as anywhere else.

Coupled to this was the need to control the political direction of domestic publics in an era of mass parties, mass media, and socio-economic disruption, a combination of factors that threatened all political systems. Secondly, the demands of total war placed an even greater imperative in mobilising national populations and resources behind the cause, while simultaneously trying to demoralise the enemy. For the United States, the establishment of the Committee of Public Information under George Creel to promote US war aims in WW I was the first crucial step in this direction.<sup>10</sup> Triggered by these developments, a central question arose that was as important for democracies as much as for dictatorships: How could ideas and information be transmitted to an audience effectively to support particular interests and norms? From the 1920s onwards, this question generated a whole field of investigation in the United States in communications studies, public relations research, and propaganda analysis.<sup>11</sup> It was Harold Lasswell who defined the central task of this research as clarifying ‘who says what to whom, and with what effect’. Studies into communications and psychological warfare produced the guidelines for effective information campaigns geared very much to promoting the national interest. While ‘mutual interest’ provided the public language of public diplomacy, psy-war methods provided the techniques to be applied. These techniques have remained the benchmark to the present day, as Jarol Manheim made clear in his description of ‘strategic public diplomacy’:

[It] incorporates the use of sophisticated knowledge of such attributes of human behaviour as attitude and preference structures, cultural tendencies, and media-use patterns...to shape and target messages so as to maximise their desired impact while minimising undesired collateral effects.<sup>12</sup>

Successful public diplomacy is more than just devising techniques by which to project specific messages – it is also about creating an appropriate organisational apparatus to intensify those messages. Ideally, this entails disengaging the public diplomacy infrastructure from the national interest / national security imperative, so that it can operate apart from foreign policy demands as much as possible. This reduces its identification with propaganda and promotes a sense of voluntary association on the part of the target audience. State-private networks depend on their private identity to achieve their goals. In this way the field of public diplomacy must attempt to project free-floating signifiers (universal values) separate from the signified (national interest).<sup>13</sup> By attempting to connect with an audience via a code of universal values, spaces can be created where the interests of the projecting group and the

receiving group coincide on (apparently) relatively equal terms (or they are at least not considered to be in conflict).

A vital element to this within the US approach has been to work with and through private institutions that provide a ‘neutral’ apparatus separate from foreign policy directives. Such state-private cooperation was at the heart of the US engagement with the world from the early 20<sup>th</sup> century onwards, and was emphasised in the major Cold War legislation: The Fulbright amendment to the Surplus Property Act, Smith-Mundt, and Fulbright-Hays. In this way the suspicion of central government combined powerfully with a messianic belief in the capabilities and outreach of unfettered private enterprise. The use of private organisations and citizens as interlocutors in contact with other nations had several advantages: It provided greater credibility and legitimacy; it appeared spontaneous and thus a reflection of a dynamic, committed domestic society; it was flexible, allowing for what George Urban referred to as the ‘privatisation of the Cold War’<sup>14</sup>; and it conveyed domestic political advantages to those forces that could successfully mobilise the popular will behind their cause. In the conditions of the Cold War these factors led to the creation of a vast, dynamic network of state and private forces, both overt and covert, to promote the national interest.

### **The Paradigm Works: Promoting American Studies**

If there was one area where this Cold War paradigm worked successfully, it was in the promotion of American Studies outside of the United States. From the outset, the goal was to foster the formation of a wide community of scholars and intellectuals with a cultural affinity for American history, culture and society and whose research interests would focus on the United States as a unique object of investigation. This body of sympathisers would also contribute towards confirming the status of the USA as the global ‘benchmark nation’. The Fulbright Program played a vital role by facilitating increased mobility between scholars, particularly across the Atlantic. US diplomat William Draper went so far as to describe it as “the thought stream of the Atlantic Community”.<sup>15</sup> The strategic value of this was always of fundamental importance, as J. Manuel Espinosa of the State Department’s Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs outlined in 1961:

The study of American subjects in the educational systems of other countries strengthens the basis for a better understanding of American life and institutions on the part of those elements of the population that shape public opinion and give direction to national policy – through educators, students, intellectuals, serious writers, and other leadership elements.<sup>16</sup>

Reports from US embassies around the world consistently confirmed the value of this approach, as this memo from Paris in the early 1960s indicates:

We are convinced that the French will never fully understand our policies, much less approve them, without a greater appreciation of our history, literature, social, economic, and political systems. This will require a long-range effort, and one of the most logical means to sustain it is the promotion of ‘American Studies’ in the 19 universities throughout France.<sup>17</sup>

A crucial part of this promotion was the aim to institutionalise American Studies programmes within the structure of higher education. A USIA survey of Western Europe in the late 1950s declared that the ultimate aim was to foster “a stable program from a Conference to a Committee on American Studies to regularized courses to a Chair and finally to an Institute”.<sup>18</sup>

Within the broad correlation between the promotion of American Studies and US strategic goals, specific cases can be identified where these processes were directly connected. The negative fall-out from the Suez Crisis in November 1956 contributed to an increased US public-private effort to establish an American Studies community in the UK, ultimately leading to the formation of BAAS.<sup>19</sup> The aim to secure New Zealand’s support for the Vietnam war, in particular in the form of troops, led to an expanded public diplomacy drive during 1965-66.<sup>20</sup> During the mid 1980s the Netherlands was the target of a well-coordinated attempt to bolster favourable opinion towards the United States, in order to counter-act the widespread rejection by the Dutch public of the placement of Cruise missiles in their country.

Yet despite these examples, American Studies (as free-floating signifier) on the whole *was* successfully kept separate from US foreign policy interests (the signified). The apparatus used to promote it displayed the perfect characteristics to avoid such a linkage. Its main channels –

the Fulbright Program and the Salzburg Seminar - incorporated a mutual framework that allowed for equal European participation (all Fulbright Commissions were bi-national in composition). While USIS coordinated the promotional effort, much of the actual financial and administrative logistics were carried out by the major US foundations such as Rockefeller, Ford and, later, Mellon. Non-Americans were fully aware of the hegemonic associations American Studies carried with it, but were able to maintain their autonomous identity. Many Europeans in particular recognised, as Sigmund Skard put it, the need for “reorientation among themselves” in order to fully grasp the realities and the necessities of post-WW II US power.<sup>21</sup> In short, there was a successful meeting of interests.

### **The Paradigm Stretched: Post-Cold War Public Diplomacy**

The end of the Cold War, encapsulated by the end of the Soviet state and its Eastern European empire, removed the principal ideological divide that had ordered global politics for the previous 50 years. Yet the appearance of an open field for the propagation of US-led market democracy, a great leap forward sanctioned by the demise of the communist competitor, turned out to be illusory. The processes of globalisation through the 1990s have led instead to a highly contested and congested global information sphere in the early 21<sup>st</sup> century. ‘Full Spectrum Dominance’ may be attainable within the military sector, but the spread of internet and the empowerment of the citizen-reporter have gradually undermined presumptions of message control. Coupled with this dynamic was the increase in the number and variety of non-state actors who could claim a legitimate role in international affairs, and the pressures put on all nation-states to adapt to the competitive forces of footloose neoliberal capitalism. The result has been much talk of a ‘revolution in diplomatic affairs’ as states reassess their interests and approaches in order to function successfully in a rapidly changing global political environment.<sup>22</sup>

The changing outlook of the nation-state has obviously had a direct impact on how public diplomacy can still be utilised as a valuable foreign policy tool. Above all, it has generally led to lowered expectations as to what it can achieve in a crowded infosphere.

Because most ideas that people absorb about a country are beyond the control of national governments, governments can only have an impact at the margins by seeking

to clear paths for the most positive messages to reach mass audiences while working directly to influence the opinion of niche audiences.<sup>23</sup>

In place of futile attempts to control all information outlets and non-state actors, the aim has shifted more towards proposals ‘to create image and value platforms’ and ‘network relationships’ around which state and non-state actors can congregate and mobilise. In this relationship the state no longer appears as the dominant actor.<sup>24</sup> These new demands have given rise to much debate about the value of ‘branding’, which refers to the aim ‘to create a distinguishing name and/or symbol that is intended to differentiate one country from another’.

The advocates of nation-branding argue that like any global multinational, a country could brand itself as well. They point out that similar to a company, a country exists and operates in a highly competitive environment. Both are dependent on resources and supportive behaviour and, more importantly, each must appeal to an audience.<sup>25</sup>

This cannot be a top-down process, since its legitimacy rests on the all-inclusive involvement of the national population who need to recognise themselves in the ‘product’. If it is successful, it can lead to an increased visibility for and recognition of a particular nation-state’s qualities and capabilities. Thus, the adoption of commercial techniques to create a National Brand enables a nation-state to compete in the global media landscape by projecting “a way of life, an attitude, a set of values, a look, and idea”.<sup>26</sup>

### **The New American Studies meets the New Public Diplomacy**

During the ‘Engaging the New American Studies’ conference at Birmingham University in May, Alan Nadel gave a plenary talk in which he proclaimed that American Exceptionalism was effectively unravelling in the conditions of the early 21<sup>st</sup> century. The US is becoming no more than “a nation among nations”, such that the once-dominant “ahistorical actor on the historical stage” is re-entering history as a normalised entity. ‘America’ can no longer claim a single, coherent, teleological interpretation, and the (universal, ahistorical, exceptional) values which provided the foundations for the Cold War paradigm of American Studies (and the public diplomacy apparatus that promoted it) are now being questioned, if not wholly rejected. The outcome is that the object of enquiry is no longer focused on what ‘America’ is,

but on what people do with the many narratives of 'America' that are in circulation, be they positive, negative, flamboyant, perverse, insane, or whatever.<sup>27</sup>

This shift has major consequences, not just for how the United States is studied but also for the ways in which US public diplomacy has to interact with an academic field that is morphing and escaping the Cold War paradigm. Above all, the fragmentation of 'Americas', as Nadel sketches it, prevents the message from being reconstituted and sold as a new universally-acceptable whole. The US itself no longer has a monopoly on what 'America' is, or how it can be 'performed'. The upshot of this is that US public diplomacy can no longer claim the privileged position it once had in directing the identity and purpose of American Studies, since it is now simply one player among many. During the Cold War the public diplomacy state-private apparatus was the privileged actor, directing resources and mobilising allies in a coordinated process along the teleological path of Conference-Committee-Courses-Chair-Institute. This situation no longer applies, however much it is recalled in current debate, because American Studies no longer fits that model.<sup>28</sup> The promotion of American Studies, which once provided the ideological legitimacy for the global extension of US power, can now only assume the traits of 'niche' public diplomacy within a highly contested intellectual and moral terrain. The 'universal values' of American Exceptionalism have become no more than one set of values among all others, each trying to get ahead to claim sufficient 'air time'. And in the early 21<sup>st</sup> century, the American Brand is badly damaged and struggling to adapt to these radically-changed circumstances.

### **Possible Futures**

In this scenario, what are the possible futures for the New American Studies? Firstly, there is above all a need to psychologically disengage and then re-engage with the United States as a subject of enquiry. This refers to the mental shift required in necessarily shielding the New American Studies from trite and pointless anti-Americanism and instead guiding it towards anti-'America-as-benchmark'. In the academic world, the pulling power of US higher education has long been strong enough to structure the configurations and hierarchies of academic production, leading to a clear centre-periphery dynamic.<sup>29</sup> Instead of constantly looking to the centre for recognition, the New American Studies should make the utmost of its room for manoeuvre in the periphery by disengaging from the established tropes of success

handed down by the Cold War paradigm and re-engaging *at a distance and on its own terms*. The internationalisation of American Studies, as called for in recent years by that centre-of-centres, the ASA, should, in the terms in which it has been presented, therefore be bypassed at all costs.<sup>30</sup>

Secondly, there are the ever-present dangers of institutionalisation and, as a result, the banal ‘commodification’ of the New in which a novel enterprise degenerates into the eternal return of the same. These forces are extremely difficult to escape, and might be said to be the irrepressible bane of academic (or any) organisation once it tries to solidify its identity and its base. Yet they should not be allowed to usher in a reconstitution of a universally-acceptable ‘America’ by the back door. A cultural analogy is required here. About 18 years ago Bono gave an interview in which he expressed his wish to produce a rock song that would only be released as a single. The inspiration for this move was the Rolling Stones track, Jumping Jack Flash, which was issued as a single in 1968 and remained a stand-alone track that did not appear on the Stones’ album of that year, *Beggars Banquet*.<sup>31</sup> The point that can be drawn from this is that it can be more powerful to generate a unique one-off event that stands apart on its own terms, and for that reason becomes sought after, rather than to take the convenient, corporate-formatted decision to subsume it within a larger context. Translating this analogy into a successful strategy within the academic realm is admittedly no easy task, but the notion of a shifting network of like-minded Americanistas temporarily congregating and then moving on is not so different from what now occurs on the existing transnational conference circuit. Looking for further analogies to encapsulate what is happening here, it might be possible to think of these events as Temporary Autonomous Zones that occupy and claim spaces and temporarily place them outside of the state/corporate-based power structure.<sup>32</sup> The challenge is how to reproduce this in the future without falling into the petrification that reproduction often brings with it.

Lastly, and on a more sober note, there is the set of demands that have been placed on higher education throughout the EU through the Bologna reform process. It is unclear at this point whether the standardisation (Anglicisation) of European education, with the introduction of the BA / MA structure into systems with radically different traditions, represents more of a threat than an opportunity for the field of American Studies. There is no doubt that, in combination with other factors, American Studies has definitely been weakened. Richard Ellis has outlined clearly how the pressures and costs of rationalisation in the UK university system

have marginalised the field as departments with a stronger profile increasingly carve up the available resources.<sup>33</sup> Similar moves in the Netherlands to establish graduate research schools (the ‘centres of excellence’ model) have also exposed the lack of a solid base for American Studies across Dutch universities. Nevertheless, it could be that the levelling of the playing field releases new possibilities for EU-wide exchanges and productive networks. It remains to be seen whether the New American Studies can negotiate these pitfalls, justify its existence in corporate-rational terms - and still retain both its identity and its energy as a TAZ.

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<sup>1</sup> Nick Cull, *American Overseas Propaganda and Public Diplomacy since 1945: The United States Information Agency and its World*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006.

<sup>2</sup> See Gifford Malone, *Organizing the Nation's Public Diplomacy*, Lanham NY: University Press of America, 1988, pp. 3-4.

<sup>3</sup> United States Information and Educational Exchange Act, Public Law 402, 80<sup>th</sup> Congress, 1948.

<sup>4</sup> See Frank Ninkovich, *The Diplomacy of Ideas: US Foreign Policy and Cultural Relations 1938-1950*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981; Richard Arndt, *The First Resort of Kings: American Cultural Diplomacy in the Twentieth Century*, Washington DC: Potomac Books, 2005.

<sup>5</sup> Nick Cull, ‘Public Diplomacy before Gullion: The Evolution of a Phrase’, Blog notes, USC Center on Public Diplomacy, 2006.

<sup>6</sup> See Emily Rosenberg, *Spreading the American Dream: American Economic and Cultural Expansion 1890-1945*, New York: Will & Wang, 1982; Victoria de Grazia, *Irresistible Empire: America's Advance through the 20<sup>th</sup> Century*, Cambridge MA: Harvard University Press, 2005.

<sup>7</sup> J. Manuel Espinosa, *Inter-American Beginnings of US Cultural Diplomacy, 1936-1948*, Washington DC: Department of State, 1976, p. 199.

<sup>8</sup> Joseph Nye Jr., *Soft Power: The Means to Success in World Politics*, New York: Public Affairs, pp. 7-10.

<sup>9</sup> Frank Ninkovich, *US Information Policy and Cultural Diplomacy*, Foreign Policy Association, Headline Series No. 308, p. 44.

<sup>10</sup> See George Creel, *How We Advertised America*, New York: Harper, 1920; James Mock & Cedric Larson, *Word That Won The War: The Story of the Committee on Public Information, 1917-1919*, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1939.

<sup>11</sup> See Walter Lippman, *Public Opinion*, New York: Free Press, 1949 (1922); Edward Bernays, *Crystallizing Public Opinion*, New York: Boni & Liveright, 1922; Edward Bernays, *Propaganda*, New York: Liveright, 1928; Harold Lasswell, *Propaganda Technique in the World War*, New York: Knopf, 1927; Christopher Simpson, *Science of Coercion: Communication Research and Psychological Warfare 1945-1960*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1994.

<sup>12</sup> Jarol Manheim, *Strategic Public Diplomacy and American Foreign Policy*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1994, p. 7.

<sup>13</sup> On US culture as a free-floating signifier, see Rob Kroes, ‘American Empire and Cultural Imperialism: The View from the Receiving End’, *Diplomatic History* 23/3 (Summer 1999). Kroes’ argument may be persuasive but he fails completely to address the issue of relations of power, which for him seems to fade away behind all the attractive floating signifiers of the global entertainment market-place.

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<sup>14</sup> See George Urban, *Radio Free Europe and the Pursuit of Democracy: My War within the Cold War*, New Haven: Yale University Press, 1997.

<sup>15</sup> Quoted in Walter Johnson & Francis Colligan, *The Fulbright Program: A History*, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1965, p. 121.

<sup>16</sup> 'American Studies Abroad: The Role of the Educational Exchange Program of the Department of State,' 1961, Archive of the Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs, Group IV Series 7 Box 166 Folder 10, Special Collections, University of Arkansas (hereafter 'CU').

<sup>17</sup> Communiqué from USIS Paris to Department of State, August 1963, quoted in 'American Studies: Western Europe 1958-1964', Group IV Box 167 Folder 1, CU.

<sup>18</sup> 'American Studies in Western Europe', 1957, Group IV Box 166 Folder 9, CU.

<sup>19</sup> See Ali Fisher & Scott Lucas, 'Master and Servant? The US Government and the Founding of the British Association for American Studies', *European Journal of American Culture*, 21 (1), pp. 16-25.

<sup>20</sup> USIS invested heavily in promoting American Studies at Canterbury University around the time that the New Zealand government decided to send troops to Vietnam. 'Country Assessment: Report for Calendar Year 1965,' 17 February 1966, White House Central File, Confidential File, CO 203, Declassified Documents Reference System.

<sup>21</sup> Sigmund Skard, *American Studies in Europe*, Vol. II, Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1958, p. 641.

<sup>22</sup> See Jessica Matthews, 'Power Shift', *Foreign Affairs* (January-February 1997); Brian Hocking (ed.), *Foreign Ministries: Change and Adaptation*, London: Macmillan, 1999; Jan Melissen (ed.), *Innovation in Diplomatic Practice*, Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1999; Shaun Riordan, *The New Diplomacy*, Cambridge: Polity Press, 2003.

<sup>23</sup> Mark Leonard, 'Diplomacy by Other Means', *Foreign Policy*, 132 (September-October 2002), p. 50.

<sup>24</sup> Jan Melissen, 'The New Public Diplomacy: Between Theory and Practice', in Melissen (ed.), *The New Public Diplomacy: Soft Power in International Relations*, Basingstoke: Macmillan, 2005.

<sup>25</sup> Ashvin Gonesh & Jan Melissen, *Public Diplomacy: Improving Practice*, The Hague: Clingendael, 2005, p. 20

<sup>26</sup> Naomi Klein, *No Logo*, London: Flamingo, 2001.

<sup>27</sup> Alan Nadel, 'Walt Whitman, Political Synecdoche, and Restaging the Performance of America', Engaging the New American Studies, University of Birmingham, 11-13 May 2006. See also Thomas Bender, *A Nation Among Nations: America's Place in World History*, New York: Hill & Wang, 2006.

<sup>28</sup> On the relevance of the Cold War paradigm for current debates on US public diplomacy see Robert Kelley, 'US Public Diplomacy: A Cold War Success Story?', *The Hague Journal of Diplomacy*, forthcoming 2006.

<sup>29</sup> See Ron Robin, "American Studies as a Microcosm of Academia: Center and Periphery in Higher Education," in Horwitz (ed.), *Exporting America: Essays on American Studies Abroad*, New York: Garland, 1993, pp. 77-90

<sup>30</sup> Marc Chenetier, "'New'" American Studies: Exceptionalism Redux?', paper given to the Japanese Association for American Studies, 2006.

<sup>31</sup> Some people have made the point to me that Jumping Jack Flash is available on various Rolling Stones compilation albums. But this misses the point – compilations are always after the fact, and as any music collector worth their salt knows, they are never to be regarded as comparable with original releases.

<sup>32</sup> Hakim Bey, *The Temporary Autonomous Zone: Ontological Anarchy, Poetic Terrorism*, Brooklyn: Autonomedia, 1991.

<sup>33</sup> Richard Ellis, 'USAmerican Studies in the United Kingdom', *European Journal of American Studies*, 2006, available at <http://ejas.revues.org/document448.html>.