

A Shining Example for All the World: US Hemispheric Policy and Global Strategy

Mark Spokes
University of Birmingham

Addressing the General Assembly of the Organisation of the American States (OAS) in March 2006, the US Permanent Representative John Maisto pronounced that:

The new situation in the world makes more imperative than ever the union and solidarity of the American peoples, for the defense of their rights and the maintenance of international peace.¹

Maisto was actually quoting a statement made at the Inter-American Conference on Problems of War and Peace, held at Chapultepec, Mexico, in 1945, but he expressed the belief that it is also relevant to the current global environment. The study of United States policy toward Latin America in both the period following World War Two and in the 21st century can also be better understood by placing it within such a global context.

There are already wide-ranging analyses of US hemispheric policy during the early Cold War, but most have tended to focus upon bilateral relations or regional issues. How US global strategy shapes regional policy has been addressed most significantly in the works of scholars, such as Frank Ninkovich and Gabriel Kolko. In their grand narratives however, Latin America receives less attention than the regions that have had a more dramatic role in the history of US foreign policy. Consequently, it is mostly during critical points in US-Latin American relations that the global implications are highlighted. But the US' global role and outlook has had a far more extensive influence

and pervades hemispheric policy even without threatening situations. Contemporary studies of US-Latin American relations have suffered from the intense focus on the situation in the Middle East. As a consequence, the reciprocal influences of hemispheric and global policy have yet to be addressed. This article purposely avoids addressing all the motives of US policy in Latin America, but it presents a number of ways in how it is designed as an integral part of a global strategy.

The relationship between the regional and the global in US strategy is complex, but one of the fundamental concepts that must be understood is the tension between US strategic commitment and capabilities. The goals of the Bush administration's foreign policy are outlined in the latest National Security Strategy (NSS) document, released in March 2006. It declares that US global strategy is designed to promote an international system based upon the American values of peace, freedom and democracy. Maintaining leadership of this world community against various threats and challenges would be "the best way to provide enduring security for the American people". But the NSS also warns that achieving this goal would require a colossal commitment. Promoting liberty across the world and pursuing a preponderance of power do not come cheaply.

A recent Congressional Research Service (CRS) report reveals that Congress has so far already appropriated a total of \$261 billion for Operation Iraqi Freedom alone and projections are being made for a further ten year commitment.² The dilemma for the Bush administration and its successors are that the resources for this commitment are finite. Figures from the Treasury Department's Bureau of the Public Debt show that the US national debt already stands at \$8.3 trillion.³ The global challenges and their costs are yet more extensive. The NSS forewarns that: "The United States is in the early years of a long struggle, similar to what our country faced in the early years of the Cold War." During the early Cold War, policymakers committed the US to this global struggle without knowing whether their country had the means or resilience to see it through. Similar questions are being asked of the US in the 'Global War on Terror'. By analysing how early Cold War policymakers attempted to reconcile this tension, this research also provides clues to understanding the policy of the Bush administration and offers the

groundwork for further exploration of the strains of overreach in the contemporary situation.

This paper explores how early Cold War policymakers relied on the perception of demonstrations of US capability. The strain between goals and means would be resolved by using limited resources to ensure the success of symbolic examples. Hemispheric relations have played a vital part of this strategy. US policymakers attempted to demonstrate the credibility of the American system and the prestige of US leadership within the Western Hemisphere, as well as use the region's resources and support as the foundation for flourishing examples elsewhere. In some instances, policymakers succeeded, but a number of other tensions created further problems for US regional and global strategy.

* * * * *

At last June's General Assembly of the Organisation of American States in Fort Lauderdale, George W. Bush remarked that, "by making the blessings of freedom real in our hemisphere, we will set a shining example for all the world."⁴ The President's comments are not only indicative of the enduring American goal of creating a world order based upon the American way of life, but also of the limits upon US policymakers to impose their vision of an American-dominated global order.

Approaching the end of World War Two, US officials realised that plans to lead a global model of peaceful cooperation and economic interdependency were attainable, but acknowledged that their success would be largely dependent on the integration of the core industrialised countries. US global influence had not previously been sufficient to force European powers to abandon a system based on balancing power and colonial control of large parts of the world. Together with a domestic aversion to the idea of forcibly spreading the American sphere of influence, this European resistance led

policymakers to attempt to draw other nations into the American orbit by persuading them of its benefits. The early ideas of Thomas Jefferson, that a model of liberty in the US for the world to emulate was the best way to spread the American way of life, were adapted by policymakers who hoped to present a working hemispheric model of the American vision. A successful inter-American system would demonstrate the opportunities afforded by the alternative of a peaceful economic interdependency.

The foundations of the hemispheric model had already been laid earlier in the century and had been well developed in the administration of Franklin D. Roosevelt. At the end of World War Two, many officials believed that the success of the regional example and the prominent economic position the US found itself in would allow the US to entice other nations into the establishment of a larger international framework of economic interdependency and mutual security. However, a number of officials were still unsure of whether the US held the authority and commitment needed to guarantee the success of the system. Despite recognising the priorities of integrating Europe into the American orbit, George F. Kennan noted that if the US were to fail, "Latin America would be all we would have to fall back on". A number of policymakers that had been instrumental to Roosevelt's Good Neighbour Policy remained in prominent positions and sought to continue developing their concept of hemispheric unity.⁵ Key figures, such as the State Department's Coordinator of Inter-American Affairs, Nelson Rockefeller, expressed that unless the US "operated with a solid group in this hemisphere" it "could not do what [it] wanted to do on the world front".⁶ Rockefeller believed that providing a regional example of a community of nations that benefited from commercial liberty, which could be emulated elsewhere, was the best step toward the ultimate goal of a global economic system.⁷

Whilst the conferences of Dumbarton Oaks and San Francisco laid the path for international organisation, the administration of Harry S. Truman did not abandon the model of hemispheric unity. US insistence on including Article 51 in the United Nations (UN) Charter allowed them to develop an autonomous inter-American system. The Inter-American Conference for the Maintenance of Continental Peace and Security at Rio de

Janeiro in August 1947 formalised a mutual security pact that had been initiated in the 1945 Act of Chapultepec. The 1948 Tenth Conference of American States in Bogotá advanced regional cooperation in establishing an institutional and legal framework for the Western Hemisphere under the guise of the OAS. Policymakers hoped that this international cooperation would demonstrate a more appealing model than the looming nationalist and communist alternatives. The State Department noted that:

The role of Latin America in the present “war for men’s minds” is critical.” The success of Latin American states in making freedom work effectively will have a significant moral value throughout the world as it will demonstrate that the inter-American system is viable within the framework of democracy.⁸

However, enduring tensions between different approaches to foreign policy within the US decision-making establishment produced a number of problems for the Truman administration’s attempts at regional cooperation. Some US policymakers espoused Pan-Americanism through a genuine belief in assisting the development of the Western Hemisphere. Many others however, regarded it only as necessary to alleviate Latin American revolutionary fervour and maintain the economic order.

Latin Americans had been keen to foster Truman’s readiness to continue the relationship of the Good Neighbour Policy and permanently eradicate the US interventionism that had dominated regional dynamics beforehand. But as important, was the belief that cooperation would lead to economic cooperation that would draw the region out of its deprived state. After establishing the military and legal framework of hemispheric cooperation at Rio and Bogotá, Latin Americans looked forward to a conference at Buenos Aires that would finalise an economic charter. They would be disappointed however, as the US indefinitely postponed the conference and reneged on pledges of post-war economic assistance and removal of imbalanced trade agreements. US liberals who had advocated hemispheric liberation saw this commitment to economic development gradually diminish as they were shifted to the periphery of the

policymaking process and were supplanted by those who regarded non-interventionism as adequate means to maintain unity.

The Truman administration was also becoming increasingly aware that a distant hemispheric example would not be enough to persuade Europe to enter the American sphere of influence and it would have to play a more active role in the region to guarantee the success of its new global order. Without a commitment to support friendly European governments, policymakers were concerned they may embrace alternative models to rebuild their shattered economies and alleviate mounting unrest. US policymakers not only feared any autonomous development that would close US access to the European core and their colonies, but also became increasingly concerned about the communist alternative that the Soviet Union embodied. Europe was becoming a battleground, in which the US would have to demonstrate the superiority of its leadership and vision of the future over the Soviet alternative.

The Marshall Plan and the Truman Doctrine committed US resources to the restoration of European economies and to curbing the influence of communism. The plans for European economic recovery gave Latin Americans renewed optimism that they would receive some assistance from the US in return for their support during World War Two. The Truman administration had limited resources however, which meant that in order to fulfil its global goals, it would need to route them into demonstrating its commitment to the priority area of Europe. "We cannot scatter our shots equally all over the world," explained Dean Acheson. "We just haven't got enough shots to do that.... If anything happens in Western Europe the whole business goes to pieces."

Despite numerous requests, Truman dashed any remaining Latin American hopes for economic assistance when he expressed his belief that their problems were "small in contrast with the struggle for life itself that engrosses the people of Europe" and even hoped that they would assist Europe. The Truman administration left the responsibility of economic development to the Latin Americans themselves and their ability to attract private investment.⁹ Not only would economic assistance be unforthcoming, but the US

removed the price controls that existed during the war and allowed the price of US goods to increase beyond the affordability of Latin America. Latin America began to play a new role in the US' global strategy as the Truman administration began to welcome any regimes that would maintain an open market for US goods and capital that would assist the US in rebuilding and feeding of Europe. Whilst still wishing to oblige by regional laws of non-interventionism, Truman became increasingly reliant on Department of Defense plans to redistribute the burden of maintaining order with military assistance to friendly Latin American leaders.

The removal of the American financial commitment to Latin America and the strengthening of US regional economic power enabled the US to demonstrate a reliable commitment to European welfare and preclude the alternatives. However, the State Department, although recognising European priorities, generally agreed with the liberal Latin American specialists. Their belief that unrest stemmed from the social and economic conditions, led them to suggest that the subordination of Latin American development to these precedents and support of military repression would radicalise the discontented and push them into the hands of the Communist movements. The escalation of the Cold War had led to the growing belief within other elements of the Truman administration that communism was the source of instability. The minimal threat of communism in Latin America caused many officials to have little concern for any problems in the region.

US policymakers were soon considering the international environment as a zero-sum game, in which any damage to US prestige would be considered as beneficial to the Soviet Union. In 'The Strategy of Freedom' presented in National Security Council (NSC) Document 68, the threat was highlighted: "The assault on free institutions is world wide now, and in the context of the present polarization of power a defeat of free institutions anywhere is a defeat everywhere".¹⁰ Not only would the US have to persuade Europe and its other allies that its global model was superior to the Soviets, but it would also have to demonstrate that it could contain a Soviet military threat with unrivalled power.

As US resolve and military prestige was tested in Korea, hemispheric unity became essential for the augmentation of US power in the global arena. In the event of war, reliable access to Latin American resources and markets was considered as the source of the US' global projection of power. The US would also rely on Latin American support against the Soviet Union in the UN. The Jeffersonian tradition was increasingly discarded in favour of a pursuit of power. Following instead the approach to foreign policy advocated by Alexander Hamilton, which prioritised securing US interests, the Truman administration continued to support regimes that could curb domestic opposition and lend support to the US' global anti-communist strategy. Maintaining a dependable source of US power, Latin America would support the US' global strategy of demonstrating US prestige in its conflict with the Soviet Union in various global theatres. However, the Truman administration's encouragement of economic dependency and the proliferation of military dictatorships in the region, inevitably led to a 'rising tide of revolution' and anti-Americanism in Latin America.

US policymakers were aware that the credibility of the American system would be seriously damaged if a nation within the American orbit were to take an autonomous path. The symbolic defeat would be significantly worse within the US' 'backyard', where the US had an established assertion of leadership. The new administration of Dwight D. Eisenhower believed that such a threat to the US' global reputation was posed by the Guatemalan government of Jacobo Arbenz. The NSC warned that Guatemala provided the "leading example of communist penetration in the American Republics."¹¹ Whilst many reports actually recognised that communism was less prevalent than nationalism and anti-Americanism, the Cold War Manichaeian framework led many policymakers to conclude that any defiance of US regional hegemony would be universally perceived as a blow to American credibility and a triumph for Soviet communism. A National Intelligence Estimate warned that although Communist objectives had not been to control Guatemala, their encouragement of autonomy would create a dangerous precedent.¹² Louis J. Halle of the Policy Planning Staff warned of even more damage if Guatemala could make a successful demonstration of this alternative model that would appeal to

other nations within the Western Hemisphere.¹³ With allusion to the domino theory, many Washington policymakers feared that the Guatemalan weak link would place the entire region under threat.

Eisenhower's Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs, Henry F. Holland, feared that the US would not be able to defend its credibility as the Western Hemisphere was "the only area in the world that the US has formally renounced the right to take unilateral measures against communism."¹⁴ But the Eisenhower administration was not prepared to openly violate regional laws that prohibited unilateral intervention in the fear that it would destroy the inter-American system, but instead developed covert plans designed to remove Arbenz.¹⁵ The covert dissemination of anti-Arbenz propaganda by the United States Information Agency (USIA) and CIA operations against Guatemala have received much examination elsewhere, but these measures are also important in a global context.

Ascendancy in the Western Hemisphere gave the US a clear advantage to pit the US model against that of the Soviets. Eisenhower and his Secretary of State, John Foster Dulles, recognised that a united hemispheric rejection of communism would provide a symbolic demonstration of support for the American system and damage the credibility of Soviet communism. Dulles sought an OAS resolution that multilaterally extended the Monroe Doctrine to include the prohibition of foreign ideologies, specifically communism, in the Western Hemisphere. Latin American economic dependency on the US allowed Dulles to eliminate the appeal of the Guatemalan example and mobilise OAS opinion in support of his proposal. Guatemala was continually denied loans, grants, technical assistance and military aid, whilst US officials made it clear to Arbenz and other Latin American leaders that this isolation was the price for non-cooperation. US domination of the OAS provoked the Soviet Union to support Guatemala and insist that the matter be taken up by the UN Security Council. However, the US had guaranteed its regional hegemony with Article 51 of the UN Charter, which granted the OAS authority in hemispheric issues. Eisenhower ensured that the British and French Security Council

representatives would cooperate by threatening to withdraw US support for their own colonial problems in Cyprus and Egypt.¹⁶

Such actions revealed that US policymakers were becoming more concerned about credibility in its confrontations with the Soviet Union and communism than courting European allies. Halle warned that the reputation and prestige of the US was being damaged as regional and global allies became increasingly frustrated by what they perceived as US anti-communist single-mindedness and acts of international lawlessness.¹⁷ Despite Halle's warning that in continuing such actions, "we may commit errors of historic significance", Eisenhower authorised plans for similar covert operations against the new threat posed by Fidel Castro's regime in Cuba.¹⁸ The Cuban model however, would likely be more appealing to a Latin American region that was becoming increasingly discontent with their poor standard of living. The first meeting of an interdepartmental group on Cuba further cautioned that the Soviet Union would likely provide enough economic assistance to Cuba to create an effective example of communist development.¹⁹

The interdepartmental group acknowledged that the Cold War battleground had shifted away from the core and the US would now also have to demonstrate a credible development model to keep the periphery nations within the US orbit. Years earlier, with the Cold War front centred in Europe, George F. Kennan had noted that the real danger was the belief that communism was "the coming thing, the movement of the future - that it is on the make and there is no stopping it".²⁰ The danger was the same, but Soviet officials were now aspiring to compete with the US for the allegiance for the Third World and Latin America. John Foster Dulles acknowledged that whilst the US treated Latin Americans as political equals, economic dependency continued to cause resentment. The Eisenhower administration had long stood by its policy of supporting full recognition and free trade. With a characteristic display of his disparaging view of Latin Americans, Dulles expressed his fear that the US was "hopelessly far behind the Soviets in developing controls over the minds and emotions of unsophisticated peoples."²¹ Yet despite mounting Latin American unrest that revealed its potential at riots during Vice-

President Richard Nixon's trip to the region and the subsequent Cuban revolution, the administration only made minor concessions of economic assistance and encouragement of democracy.

Fundamental change was not promised until the new President, John F. Kennedy, established a Task Force to look at Latin American problems. It noted that the Soviet Union and China had made designs to transform social unrest in Latin America into communism and bring the Cold War to the region.²² Whilst they both had revolutionary doctrines for development, the Task Force warned that "the United States has stated no clear philosophy of its own, and has no effective machinery to disseminate such a philosophy." The liberal Latin American specialist, Adolf A. Berle Jr., who had been involved with Roosevelt's Good Neighbour Policy, noted that "while the great Cold War could not be decisively won in the Latin America theatre, it obviously could be lost there, and that situation seemed to me and to most of the Committee very dangerous."

With Kennedy's assertion that Latin America was the Cold War priority, liberals like Berle returned from the fringes to develop inter-American policy. Berle argued that: "Either we build a true and brilliant community in the Western Hemisphere – or we go under." Kennedy's Special Assistant, Arthur Schlesinger, also advised the President that they would have to promote American values of freedom and representative democracy and encourage economic development in Latin America. In the Cold War battle of image, the US would have to present itself as a transformative force. By demonstrating American commitment to development in the Alliance for Progress, the Kennedy administration hoped to stem revolutionary fervour and gain Latin American cooperation in damaging Soviet communism through opposition to Cuba.

Latin Americans hailed Kennedy and the Alliance for Progress and became optimistic that the US genuinely sought to improve inter-American relations. Nonetheless, as an example of the US power to liberate, the Alliance for Progress would never have the success that the Marshall Plan had achieved, as the US balance of payments deficit prevented giving aid on any similar scale. The Alliance very quickly revealed itself as a

public image exercise rather than any real intent to liberate Latin Americans. The First Meeting of the Working Group on Problems of the Alliance for Progress in January 1962 noted that:

There may be very real merit in concentrating efforts on a few cases which can become demonstrations of what we are able to do when we set our minds to it. Too much dispersion may lead to inconspicuous results; concentration of effort may make demonstrations possible.²³

Extensive propaganda programs were mounted to ensure that these assistance programs were recognised and the US model would be globally acclaimed as the inevitable future of mankind. Similarly, the US started programs to discredit the Cuban and Soviet communist models, with economic sanctions and attempts to demonstrate its economic faults. Latin Americans became increasingly frustrated by the Kennedy administrations eagerness to prioritise Cuba over economic development. The American theory of development, shaped by the likes of Walt Rostow, was also regarded by Latin Americans as little different to earlier policies that advocated modernisation through replication of the US model and the encouragement of free trade and US private investment. The New Frontiersmen of the Kennedy administration did not fully appreciate the limitations of their ability to shape the world. With the resources that they were prepared to commit, their bold ambitions to liberate Latin America would never be realised.

* * * * *

Like the New Frontiersmen, many in the Bush administration have believed in US ability to shape its global environment. But recent events have shown US leaders that despite predominance in military power, their influence is not absolute. The 2006 NSS does acknowledge the tension between the goals and the resources available to achieve them.

It notes that whilst US policymakers will be *principled* in goals, they need to be *pragmatic* in means. They will be guided by interests to balance priorities and will only make visible steps in certain cases. The priorities in this latest strategy are clearly set in the Middle East, where the US fights the frontline on the 'Global War on Terror'.

In the Middle East, the Bush administration has emulated its early Cold War predecessors in its determination to ensure the success of the symbolic examples of US military and transformative power. But they are also encountering a similar resistance, which could damage American claims of power and liberation if it continues. The Bush administration and its successors could well attempt to resolve this as the Cold Warriors had done, with an escalation of commitment. Eisenhower was of the opinion that, "the only solution to a lack of credibility was more credibility; the only sense answer to lack of commitment, yet more commitment."²⁴ Further commitments from the Bush administration, without the resources to fulfil them however, would ultimately make it harder to maintain a credible demonstration of its power in the Middle East.

These limited resources have already ensured that Latin America, due to the minimal threat it poses in the 'Global War on Terror', has largely been disregarded by the Bush administration. The recent Summit of the Americas revealed the same approach to Latin American development as was taken by the US during the early Cold War. Whilst US resources are used in Iraq, Latin American progress would have to be managed by attempting to attract private investment through open trade, the reduction of costs and deregulation. At the same time, US power has been further augmented by its reluctance to end agricultural subsidies and to lower tariffs and is largely uninhibited by the small amount of aid it surrenders to Latin America. A CRS report shows that including Iraq reconstruction funding, the Middle East received nearly $\frac{3}{4}$ of US foreign aid in FY 2004, with Latin America receiving just over a tenth.²⁵

Despite the focus on the Middle East, the US continues to see Latin America playing some symbolic role in its global strategy. In seeking to extend its vision for an integrated global economy, the Bush administration has put free trade at the centre of inter-

American relations. The Deputy Assistant Secretary for Western Hemisphere Affairs, Elizabeth A. Whitaker, recently heralded the North American Free Trade Agreement as a model of freedom and opportunity for the Hemisphere and the world. But as during the early Cold War, the UN Economic Commission for Latin America continues to argue that free trade sustains US trade domination through its superior economic power.²⁶ John Maisto even acknowledges that persuading Latin Americans of the benefits of US recommendations and curtail their discontent, will only be achieved if the US fulfils their demands for prioritising social programs that deal with poverty and inequality. At last year's Summit of the Americas, the US delegation continued to push for a commitment to the creation of the Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA). With the notable exception of Mexico, the American Republics collectively rejected the FTAA. Even more damaging to President Bush is that more Latin Americans are embracing alternatives to his vision for the Western Hemisphere. Speaking to the Summit, President Bush emphasised that American nations had to choose between two competing visions:

“One offers a vision of hope. It is founded on representative government, integration into the world community, and a faith in the transformative power of freedom in individual lives. The other seeks to roll back the democratic progress of the past two decades by playing to fear, pitting neighbour against neighbour and blaming others for their own failures to provide for their people.

With US attempts at democratisation in the Middle East in mind, John Maisto had recently heralded democratic elections in Latin American countries, such as Honduras, as a powerful example for the hemisphere and beyond. Neither Maisto nor Bush has been quick however, to praise recent democratic elections of anti-American governments. Washington will inevitably have to recast their focus to their backyard if this rising nationalism in the region continues. The credibility of the American system will be severely damaged if the Western Hemisphere starts to slip out of the American orbit. If Latin American nations are allowed to protect their own economies and attempt to

redress the trade balance, the US will also suffer in its ability to project its military and economic power across the globe. To maintain the credibility of US global power, US leaders may attempt to protect its regional interests and forcibly drag Latin America back into its sphere of influence. The hope remains however, that the US seeks a new regional approach to co-opt hemispheric cooperation. The credibility of a genuine American commitment to global liberation will be demonstrated, not only in its endeavours in the Middle East, but also in attempts to assist the development of Latin America. Limited resources however, mean it is unlikely that there will be more than one shining example for the world (if any at all).

¹ Remarks by Ambassador John F. Maisto at the 32nd Special Session of OAS General Assembly Considering the Judicial Link of the Inter-American Defense Board (<http://www.oas.org/speeches/speech.asp?sCodigo=06-0041>, OAS, March 15th 2006)

² Congressional Research Service, “The Cost of Iraq, Afghanistan, and Other Global War on Terror Operations Since 9/11”, (<http://zfacts.com/metaPage/lib/CRS-Belasco-2006-04-Iraq-Costs-RL33110.pdf>, ZFacts, 2006)

³ Bureau of the Public Debt, “Online Public Debt to the Penny” (<http://www.publicdebt.treas.gov/opd/opdpenny.htm>, 2006)

⁴ Speech by the President of the United States, George W. Bush at the Opening of the OAS General Assembly, June 6th 2005 (<http://www.oas.org/speeches/speech.asp?sCodigo=05-0113>, OAS, June 2005)

⁵ Testimonies available in the Truman Library Oral Histories reveal the administration’s split in opinion over these international and federal concepts of the future.

⁶ Green, David, *The Containment of Latin America* (Chicago: Quadrangle Books, 1971) p. 234

⁷ Rockefeller, Nelson A., “Purpose and Policy”, *Foreign Affairs*, April 1960, p. 386.

⁸ State Department, “Justification of Point Four Program” 31/01/1951, *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1951, Volume I* (Washington D.C.: GPO, 1980), p. 1041

⁹ For a number of examples of US inter-American economic policy, see *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1947, Volume VIII* (Washington D.C.: GPO, 1972)

¹⁰ National Security Council, “NSC 68: United States Objectives and Programs for National Security” April 14, 1950, *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1950, Volume I* (Washington D.C.: GPO, 1976)

¹¹ National Security Council, “Draft Policy Paper Prepared in the Bureau of Inter-American Affairs,” August 19 1953, *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952-1954* (Washington D.C., Government Printing Office, 1983) Vol. IV, pp.1074-1096

¹² National Intelligence Estimate [CIA, NSC, State Department], "NIE-84 " May 19 1953, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952-1954 (Washington D.C., Government Printing Office, 1983) Vol. IV, pp.1063-73

¹³ Policy Planning Staff, "Memorandum by Louis J. Halle, Jr.," January 2 1954, Records of the Policy Planning Staff, NND 927313, RG 59, lot 65 D101, Box 79

¹⁴ Department of State, "Memorandum by the Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs(Holland) to the Secretary of State," May 14 1954, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952-1954 (Washington D.C., Government Printing Office, 1983) Vol. IV, pp. 1107-1111

¹⁵ Article I of the 1936 Buenos Aires Special Protocol Relative to Non-Intervention and Article XV of the 1948 Charter of the OAS forbade US unilateral intervention in Guatemala. Some in the administration highlighted that Article XIX of the OAS stipulated that non-intervention was overruled in the situation set out by the Rio de Janeiro 1947 Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance, which stated that: "An act of aggression against one American state is an act of aggression against all the other American states." It should be noted that this was not signed by Guatemala. State Department officials frequently referred to hemispheric unity when discussing measures to be taken against Guatemala. An example of the administration wanting to solve the problem without damaging hemispheric relations can be found in: National Security Council, "Draft Policy Paper Prepared in the Bureau of Inter-American Affairs," August 19 1953, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952-1954 (Washington D.C., Government Printing Office, 1983) Vol. IV, pp.1074-1096. For further examples see Foreign Relations of the United States, 1951, Volume II (Washington D.C.: GPO, 1979) and Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952-1954 (Washington D.C., Government Printing Office, 1983) Vol. IV

¹⁶ Department of State, "Memorandum of Telephone Conversation, by the Secretary of State," June 24 1954, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952-1954 (Washington D.C., Government Printing Office, 1983) Vol. IV, pp. 1184-1185

¹⁷ Policy Planning Staff, "Memorandum by Louis J. Halle, Jr. to Robert Bowie," Records of the Policy Planning Staff, June 23 1954, NND 927313, RG 59, lot 65 D101, Box 79.

¹⁸ Paper Prepared by the 5412 Committee, "A Program of Covert Action Against the Castro Regime", Washington, March 16, 1960, Foreign Relations of the Unites States, 1958-1960, Volume V (Washington D.C.: GPO, 1991) p. 850

¹⁹ State Department, "Memorandum of Conversation", January 13 1961, Foreign Relations of the Unites States, 1961-1963, Volume X, Cuba, 1961-1962 (Washington D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1960)

²⁰ Ninkovich, Frank, *Modernity and Power: A History of the Domino Theory in the Twentieth Century* (London: The University of Chicago Press, 1994) p. 173

²¹ National Security Council, "369th Meeting", 19th June 1958, Foreign Relations of the Unites States, 1958-1960, Volume V (Washington D.C.: GPO, 1991)

²² Task Force on Immediate Latin American Problems, "Report to President-elect Kennedy", January 4, 1961, Foreign Relations of the Unites States, 1961-1963, Volume XII (Washington D.C.: GPO, 1996)

²³ Working Group on Problems of the Alliance for Progress, "Highlights of the First Meeting", January 16, 1962, Foreign Relations of the Unites States, 1961-1963, Volume X (Washington D.C.: GPO, 1997)

²⁴ Ninkovich, Frank, *Modernity and Power*, p. 200

²⁵ CRS, “Foreign Aid: An Introductory Overview of U.S. Programs and Policy.”
<http://fpc.state.gov/documents/organization/31987.pdf>

²⁶ ECLA, “The Millennium Development Goals: A Latin American Perspective”,
(<http://www.eclac.cl/publicaciones/SecretariaEjecutiva/1/LCG2331/lcg2331.pdf>)